




Secession in the state of Georgia.
Reed Laurence Engle
Follow this and additional works at: http://preserve.lehigh.edu/etd
Part of the United States History Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Lehigh Preserve. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an
authorized administrator of Lehigh Preserve. For more information, please contact preserve@lehigh.edu.
Recommended Citation
Engle, Reed Laurence, "Secession in the state of Georgia." (1977). Theses and Dissertations. Paper 2102.
SECESSION IN THE STATE OF GEORGIA 
By 
Reed Laurence Engle 
A Thesis Presented 
To The Graduate Committee 
Of Lehigh University 
In Candidacy for the Degree of 




ProQuest Number: EP76375 
All rights reserved 
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. 
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, 
a note will indicate the deletion. 
uest 
ProQuest EP76375 
Published by ProQuest LLC (2015). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author. 
All rights reserved. 
This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code 
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. 
ProQuest LLC. 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 
This thesis is accepted and approved in partial 
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
Master of Arts in History. 
S-- V- 7/ 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
LIST OF TABLES  iv 
LIST OF MAPS viii 
ABSTRACT     V • • • 1 
I. INTRODUCTION  3 
II. GEORGIAN SOCIETY IN i860  10 
A. THE REALITY OF THE PLAIN FOLK IN GEORGIA i2 
B. GEORGIA'S TIDEWATER ARISTOCRACYI 
APPROXIMATING THE SOUTHERN IDEAL  35 
C. COTTON AND GEORGIAN SOCIETY  & 
III. ' THE POLITICS OF SLAVERY  79 
A. THE HEART OF GEORGIAN SOCIETYi SLAVERY . 82 
B. THE FEAR OF SLAVE REVOLT  91 
C. THE END OF THE DECADE  97 
IV. THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF i860  99 
A.  VOTING PATTERNS IN THE PRESIDENTIAL 
ELECTION OF i860  112 
V. THE LAST REFERENDUM  133 
A. COMPETITION LEVELS IN THE ELECTION OF 
DELEGATES  135 
B. A COMPARISON OF i860 POLITICAL VOTE WITH 
VOTE FOR CONVENTION DELEGATES  144 
C. THE DELEGATE ELECTIONS IN THE COTTON 
COUNTIES OF GEORGIA  150 
D. THE DELEGATE ELECTIONS AS INDICATORS OF 
SECESSION SENTIMENTS IN GEORGIA  157 
VI. THOUGHTS ON SECESSION IN GEORGIA  163 













LIST OF TABLES 
PAGE 
- DISTRIBUTION OF SLAVE- 
OWNERSHIP IN GEORGIA IN 
i860 ....14 
- GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION 
OF SLAVEHOLDERS IN GEORGIA 
IN i860 .....21 
- THE STATISTICAL DISTRIBUTION 
OF FARMS IN GEORGIA IN 
I860 22 
- NUMBERS OF LIVESTOCK IN 
GEORGIA IN 1850 AND 
I860 ...., 27 
- STATISTICS OF GEORGIA COTTON 
COUNTIES THAT SHOWED A 
POPULATION DECLINE FROM 1850 
TO 1860 67 
- STATISTICS OF GEORGIA COTTON 
COUNTIES THAT HAD POPULATION 
INCREASES FROM 1850-1860 68 
- A SUMMARY OF THE COTTON 
COUNTIES WITH POPULATION 
CHANGES FROM 1850-1860 BY 
GEOGRAPHIC AREA 70 
- THE TEN COUNTIES WITH THE 
GREATEST CONSTITUTIONAL 
UNION VOTE IN i860 114 
- THE TEN COUNTIES WITH THE 
GREATEST NORTHERN DEMOCRATIC 
VOTE IN I860 114 
- THE TEN COUNTIES WITH THE 
GREATEST SOUTHERN DEMOCRATIC 
VOTE IN i860 ...115 
- STATISTICS OF THE TWENTY- 
FIVE COUNTIES WITH THE GREATEST 
NUMBERS OF FARMS UNDER 100 





STATISTICS OF THE SEVEN 
GREATEST RICE-PRODUCING 
COUNTIES IN 1860.........117 
VOTING RECORD OF THE TEN 
COUNTIES WITH THE GREATEST 
CONSTITUTIONAL UNION VOTE 
IN i860 122 
TABLE FOURTEEN VOTING RECORD OF THE TEN 
COUNTIES WITH THE GREATEST 
NORTHERN DEMOCRATIC VOTE 





VOTING RECORD OF THE TEN 
COUNTIES WITH THE GREATEST 
SOUTHERN DEMOCRATIC VOTE 
IN I860., 123 
SIGNIFICANT CORRELATIONS 
OF VARIABLES WITH POLITICAL 
PARTIES IN THE i860 
ELECTION ...125 
SIGNIFICANT CORRELATIONS 
OF VARIABLES WITH POLITICAL 
PARTIES IN I860 AMONG THE 
NINETEEN LARGEST COTTON- 
PRODUCING COUNTIES 127 




CORRELATION OF THREE 
FACTORS WITH POLITICAL 
PARTIES IN THE i860 
ELECTION  ,130 
TABLE TWENTY-ONE  - 
COUNTIES IN WHICH THE LEAST 
VOTES WERE CAST IN THE 
DELEGATE ELECTIONS.../... 136 
COUNTIES IN WHICH MORE 
VOTES WERE CAST IN THE 






COMPETITION INDEX VALUES 
FOR COUNTY DELEGATE 
ELECTIONS COMPARED WITH 
i860 VOTE AND ORDINANCE 
POSITION , 




TABLE TWENTY-SEVEN  - 
TABLE TWENTY-EIGHT  - 
TABLE TWENTY-NINE 
SUMMARY OF STATISTICS OF 
COUNTIES WHOSE DELEGATES 
VOTED AGAINST THE 
ORDINANCE  
SUMMARY OF STATISTICS OF 
COUNTIES WHOSE DELEGATES 




SUMMARY OF COMPETITION 
LEVELS AND VOTER TURNOUT 
BY GEOGRAPHIC AREAS  143 
GEORGIA COUNTIES* POLITICAL 
AFFILIATION COMPARED WITH 
DELEGATIONS ELECTION AND 
FINAL VOTE ON ORDINANCE.... 147 
A SUMMARY OF i860, DELEGATE, 
AND ORDINANCE VOTE  149 
STATISTICS OF THE COTTON- 
PRODUCING COUNTIES LOSING 
POPULATION BY GEOGRAPHIC 
AREA AND ORDINANCE VOTE.... 152 
STATISTICS OF THE COTTON- 
PRODUCING COUNTIES GAINING 
POPULATION BY GEOGRAPHIC 
AREA AND ORDINANCE VOTE.... 153 
THE STATISTICS OF ALL COTTON- 
PRODUCING COUNTIES LOSING 
POPULATION BY GEOGRAPHIC 
AREA  154 
THE STATISTICS OF ALL COTTON- 
PRODUCING COUNTIES GAINING 
POPULATION BY GEOGRAPHIC 
AREA  155 
vi. 
TABLE THIRTY-TWO 




OF VARIABLES AMONG THE 
NINETEEN LARGEST COTTON- 
PRODUCING COUNTIES IN 
i860  •. yl56 
ANTI-SECESSION DELEGATE   \ 
VOTE COMPARED WITH LAND 
OWNERSHIP PATTERNS AND 
GEOGRAPHIC AREA l6l 
CONSTITUTIONAL UNION 
COUNTIES' STATISTICS BY 










■ ■■■ i ■ —  ii ■ in i II n 
MAP EIGHT 
MAP NXNE 
LIST OF MAPS 
PAGE 
1860 PERCENTAGE SLAVE 
DISTRIBUTION  23 
i860 PERCENTAGE OF FARMS 
UNDER 100 ACRES « 25 
i860 SWINE PER WHITE 
GEORGIAN,  29 
i860 POUNDS OF RICE PER 
WHITE, MALE ADULT 37 
MAJOR INDIAN TREATIES AND 
LAND PURCHASES 60 
POPULATION DECREASE 1850- 
1860  6k 
COTTON PRODUCTION in-i860 65 
COUNTY VOTE IN i860 PRESIDENTIAL 
ELECTION 119 
POLITICAL AFFILIATION OF GEORGIA'S 
TWENTY-FIVE LARGEST COTTON- 
PRODUCING COUNTIES IN i860 120 
vlii. 
' ABSTRACT 
Chroniclers of ante-bellum Georgia have tended 
to use geographical cliches to describe secession 
supports the northern mountain counties were unionist 
or cooperationist, the southern secessionist. When 
they have hot utilized geographic solutions, authors 
have tended to use slavery as an answer to the 
secession question! the slaveholders were radical 
separatists, the non-slaveholders supporters of the 
moderate course of action. While each viewpoint had 
a grain of truth, neither fully captured the full 
explanation of secession support in the "Empire 
State of the South" because they did not attempt to 
deal with the population of the state in anything 
but the most shallow of terms. 
In the last decade before the Civil War, Georgia 
had made great strides in becoming an industrial and 
commercial power in the south. The railroad mileage 
in the state was greater than that found in any of 
the more industrial New England states, and more 
than one-third of her white, male adults were engaged 
in non-agricultural activities. The state was still 
agricultural, but it was not agrarian. 
Almost one-half of the white families in the 
piedmont area of the state did not own farms of more 
? 
than three acres, and the large majority of white 
» 
families were either small slaveholders or owned 
no slaves at all. There would appear to be little 
evidence to support the thesis presented by Owsley 
that, there was a large, politically influential, 
middle class. 
The common folk of Georgia were tenant farmers, 
industrial workers, commercial employees and owners, 
and sustenance farmers. They were traditionally 
Democratic in vote as opposed to the traditionally 
Whig planters of the piedmont. 
The common folk were joined in their support 
of Democracy by the "aristocrats" of the tidewater, 
the only element of Georgia's ante-bellum society 
that came close to the myth of southern culture. 
The tidewater rice planters developed a world view 
that came to support secession as the only alternative 
to the perceived "threats" from the Republicans, and 
they carried the Democratic Party out of Charleston 
and into the Confederacy. 
It is believed that the non-farmowners, and 
small farmers, and some former Constitutional Union 
supporters were the basis of the anti-secession 
movement, but that they were unable to stop the tide 
of events brought about by their party, a party that 
no longer represented their views. 
I. 
INTRODUCTION 
A3 the year I860 opened it was evident that 
a struggle impended, not only between parties, 
but within parties.,.. A purely sectional party— 
that of the Republicans— was looming ever larger 
on the horizon, while the historic Democratic 
Party... was threatened with hopeless discord.,.. 
The South was now in a fighting mood....l 
The decade of the 1850's was a period of change 
and solidification of attitudes in the south. It was an 
era that saw the final development of a truly southern 
world view in respect to the society of the North. The 
political and emotional crises of the period led to 
firmer and stronger declarations to meet the needs of 
the southern states. 
In many ways, Georgia typified this trend. The 
Georgia Platform of 1850 laid the base of southern needs 
and desires, and the election of i860 judged the North's 
intent to satisfy those needs, Georgia's conservative 
vote in that election led many to view the "Empire 
State of the South" as the cotton state's leader in the 
anti-secession movement. They were, unfortunately, 
wrong in their beliefs. 
1 =* 
J. G. Randall and David Donald, The Civil War 
and Reconstruction (Lexington, Mass,, 1969), p.127. 
Georgia seceded in 1861, becoming the fifth 
state to join the ranks of the disunionists. Georgia's 
secession was a significant turning point in the course 
of the movement, for had the "Empire State" sided with 
the cooperationist or unionist position, the momentum 
of disunion would have been broken, if not halted. 
The North looked to Georgia as a leader of the 
Southern states. The most moderate of the cotton states, 
her unionist counties were to indicate the strength of 
unionist sentiment throughout the lower south. 
How the unionist position was defeated in Georgia 
has been the topic of many histories since the close of 
the Civil War. Yet, until recently, the chroniclers of 
ante-bellum Georgia have presented only two primary 
views to explain secession support within the statei 
one view defined disunion as a position defended by a 
very large majority within the state and the other 
position made use of a geographical cliche - the 
northern counties of the state were unionist, the 
southern secessionist. Neither viewpoint is able to 
withstand rigorous criticism, and neither attempts to 
view party position in the i860 election as an indicator 
of secession sentiment. 
Many newer studies, using modern sociological or 
quantative techniques have called into question many 
simplistic views of complex events. 
4 
Typical of the "large majority" viewpoint on 
Georgia's secession was the work of I. W. Avery, who, 
writing soon after the war, became the quasi-official 
historian of the state. His History of the State of 
Georgia, 18^0-1881 made an argument that at times 
seemed both apology and justification for the events 
leading to the Civil War. He stated that 
it was known that a majority of the people 
favored secession, but the minority in 
favor of cooperation and delay was very 
large and powerful... and yet, in the crazy 
fever and the noisy demonstrations the 
opposition was almost unheard and absolutely 
impotent.2 
Avery saw unionist sentiment as nonexistent, and 
cooperationist sentiment as impotent. 
The geographical position on secession was clearly 
evident in the works of E. Merton Coulter, who stated 
in Georgia! A Short History i 
the slaveholders and townpeople were the 
backbone of the secession movement, whereas 
the mountaineers and pine barrens settlers 
cast their support for the Union. Yet, there 
were some Georgians, made conservative by 
their wealth and position, who voted for the 
Union.3 
The problem with Coulter's viewpoint is that while 
he refines the obvious attempts at justification found 
2 
(New York, 1881), p.149. 
3 
(Chapel Hill, 19^7), p.1^7. 
5 
in Avery, he does not define his terms. Who were 
the slaveholders? Does the author mean all slaveholders? 
Does he see a difference between rice and cotton 
planters? The author never considered the differences 
between rice and cotton areas, nor did he make 
allowance for variations within Georgia's several 
socio-economic groups. 
These simplistic explanations for secession had 
to satisfy earlier readers until Ralph A. Wooster's 
Secession Conventions of the South called to question 
many basic assumptions of these previous views. Wooster 
presented a detailed analysis of the backgrounds of 
the members of the state secession conventions, and 
on the basis of these studies attempted to define the 
origins of secession movements within the states. 
Using .the records of the Milledgeville, Georgia, 
convention, and the manuscript Census records, the 
author projected a pattern of secession sentiment 
for the state of Georgia. His basic premise was that 
the secession movement in Georgia came 
from the heavily slave-populated, cotton 
producing counties of central and coastal 
Georgia.... Opposing immediate secession 
were those delegates representing the 
counties, less wealthy and with fewer 
slaves, of northern Georgia and the pine 
barrens regions of southern Georgia.**- 
(New York, 1967), p.117. 
6 
Wooster went on ,to define the secessionists 
as having been traditionally Democratic and the 
cooperationists and unionists as a coalition that 
had been traditionally Democratic in the northern areas 
of the state, and Whig in the southern counties. 
This study will attempt to ascertain the initial 
source of secession sentiment in Georgia, what party 
fostered that strength, and whether any of the state's 
six geographical areas found that they were no longer 
represented by their party's philosophy after the 
election of I860. Within that context, it will explore 
the main socio-economic groups within the state, and 
will attempt to demonstrate the political and emotional 
events that finally enabled the more agressive elements 
of Georgian society to gain the support necessary to 
secede. The study will make use of both traditional 
and more modern statistical.methods. 
Beyond the specific issue of Georgia's secession, 
lies the basic question of the causation of the Civil 
War. Frank L. Owsley and his school of thought have 
seen the south as composed of planters and independent 
small farmers, a vast democratic, agrarian system, where 
most men were equal in their political needs. Those 
needs, as defined by the author, were in direct 
opposition to those of the industrial north. It was 
an issue of frontier versus industry to Owsley. 
7 
Yet, in opposition to the Owsley causation belief, 
David M. Potter wrote that 
the agrarian formula fitted the south 
badly. It envisioned a subsistence economy, 
agricultural diversification, a wide 
distribution of small landholdings, a 
large class of independent husbandmen, and 
an unstratified society. The cold fact 
is that none of these features have ever 
been dominant in the south.5 
To Potter, the Civil War was caused by northern 
conflict with the "peculiar folk culture" that had 
come to characterize the south, a culture based on 
bi-racialism and hierarchy. 
Avery 0. Craven saw slavery as the root of the 
conflict and felt that 
slavery had come to symbolize values 
in each of their social-economic structures 
for which men fight or die, but for which 
they do not give up or compromise.° 
Randall and Donald^ saw the development of a 
distinct southern sectionalism in all areas of life 
as a prime cause of secession, as did Nichols , however, 
the latter author felt that the breakdown in the 
democratic process combined with a total inability 
to compromise was a more vital cause of the War. 
5 
"A Distinctive Folk Culture," in Charles Crowe, 
The Age of Civil War and Reconstruction. 1830-1900 
(HomewoodT 111., l9o"6T7~p.'5»' 123. 
6 
The Growth of Southern Nationalism 1848-1861 
(Baton Rouge, 1953T, p.397. 
7 
Randall and Donald, The Civil War and 
Reconstruction, p.48. 
8 
To that author,'the true cause was The Disruption 
of American Democracy. 
Georgia's decision to secede was critical to the 
future of the United States. Basically conservative, 
the state was the most closely akin to the north of 
all the cotton states. Developing industry, with more 
railroads than any New England state in i860, Georgia 
represented more than just the "cotton kingdom" of the 
south. An examination of the "Empire State of the 
South" and the coming of secession there should shed 
further light on the varied conflicts concerning the 
cause of the Civil War. 
8         
(New York, 19^8), pp. 504-506. 
II. 
f 
GEORGIAN SOCIETY IN i860 
Ante-bellura Georgian society was a melange of 
elements based on varied economic and agricultural 
pursuits. At its most simplistic level of interpretation, 
it has been reduced to slaveholders, non-slaveholders, 
and slaves, or the captive labor force and those whites 
that did or did not control that property. The whites 
in the south were seen as "planters" or "poor white 
trash" living in undesirable areas of the state, 
existing with little or no labor on their part. 
The revisionists have glorified the yeoman farmers 
of the south, dealing with them as a large group of 
independent frontiersmen, completely in control of their 
own destinies. They have, perhaps, seen the small farmers 
and non-slaveholders in a light with too rosy a cast. 
The great plantation owners in Georgia have 
usually been considered cotton plantersj few historians 
have dealt with the "tidewater aristocracy" based on 
the production of rice. While Georgia certainly did have 
its great cotton plantations, it also had great, and 
greater rice estates, the wealth generatedin the rice 
areas of the state produced a set of social values that 
varied with the philosophies of many of the upland 
residents. Many historians have not noted these varied 
10 
viewpoints.        , 
Within the cotton community, often seen as 
an area of singular thought, many major differences 
existed. The growers in the newer areas of the piedmont, 
having shown themselves willing to move to newer lands 
for greater cotton yields, often reacted differently to 
issues than did similar planters in the older cotton 
areas of the state. 
Excluding the slaves and the small number of free 
blacks in Georgia from consideration, this paper 
believes that Georgia was composed of several major 
white socio-economic groups in the last ante-bellum 
decadei the small farmers and non-slaveholding class 
of yeoman farmers; the non-farmowners, or non-agri- 
cultural, elements throughout the statej the cotton 
planters of the piedmont» and, the residents of the 
tidewater - the "rice aristocrats". These groups demand 
further investigation, for they all shared in the crisis 





THS REALITY OF,THE,,"PLAIN FOLK" IR GEORGIA 
Generations have passed since Appomattox, yet 
many Americans still look to the southern past with 
eyes misted by David Selznick's Scarlet 0*Harai the 
planter surveying his happy slaves from a magnolia- 
shaded terrace has become Everyman's version of the 
ante-bellum southern culture. Few dreamers of the 
southern dream are aware that Scarlet's father was 
originally a "po white trash", a small farmer, and 
that his Tara was at first a wooden shack. Few 
acknowledge the small farmers, or non-farmers, who 
made up the larger reality of southern existence, 
and when they are noted, they are usually relegated to 
the tales of Faulkner. 
Georgia seceded in l86l, an act often attributed 
to the desires of the planter-merchant class.1 Yet, the 
1 
Alexander H. Stephens in Richard M. Johnston and 
William H. Browne, The Life of Alexander H._ Stephens 
(Philadelphia, 1878T7~PP. 378-379. Carl Degler exolores 
the question of secession as a radical phenomenon in 
"The Peculiar Dissent of the Nineteenth Century South," 
in Alfred F. Youth, ed., Dissent(i Explorations in 
the History of American Rad real ism (PeKalb, Ga. , I969K 
pp. 111-135. Georgia is discussed in E. Merton Coulter, 
Georgiat A Short History, pp. 930-931* and Horace 
Montgomery, Cracker Parties (Baton Rouge, 1950), pp. 249- 
250. 
12 
planters and merchants of Georgia did not exist in 
sufficient numbers to carry the state from the Union 
by their own votes. A more detailed examination is 
necessary of the small farmers and the owners of few 
or no slaves, for their votes were vital and necessary 
for any political act in the state, and they were the 
ante-bellum majority. 
In 1850, less than 25# of the white families in 
the southern states owned slaves, only 347,825 families 
in a total of over 1,400,000.2 Georgians owned 11.9# 
(381,682) of the total of nearly 3,204,313 slaves in 
the United States, being second only to Virginia in 
numbers of slaveholders. 
Of approximately 1,400,000 white families, only 
92,570, or roughly 7.0$, were of the financial means 
to own and provide for ten or more slaves, the minimum 
ownership needed for small plantation status. Families 
holding fifty or more slaves, large slaveholders, made 
up only 0.6^ (7,732) of all white families, and 3.0# 
of slave-owning families. 
2  
All figures on  slavery from U. S. Census Office, 
7th Census, 1850, The Seventh Census- Report of the 
Superintendent of the Census, Dec. 1^ I852 [Washington, 
1853)".' U. S. Census Office, 8th Census, The Eighth 
Census of the United States, i860, 4 vols. Washington, 
1864-1865T, J. D. B. DeBow, ed., and David L. Cohn, The 
Life and Times, of King Cotton (New York, 1956), p.76. 
13 
In the decade before the Civil War, the slave 
population of the southern states increased 17%. By 
i860 3,953,760 slaves were owned by the southern states, 
with Georgia holding 11.7$ of the total, the greatest 
number in the lower south. Her 462,198 slaves represented 
a 22% increase in slaves within the state, and a 6.8% 
increase in slave-ownership. Georgia's pattern of 
ownership followed the southern distribution, except that 
it tended to be more heavily concentrated in the 5-49 
slaves-per-family category Randall and Donald considered 
to be "substantial ownership".3 
TABLE ONE indicates slave distribution in Georgia. 
TABLE ONE 
DISTRIBUTION OF SLAVE-OWNERSHIP IN GEORGIA IN i860 
Number of       Percentage of White  Percentage of 
Slaves Owned     Slave-owning Families All White 
Families 
1 16 6 
2-4 33 12 
5-9 17 6 
10-19 18 7 
20-49 13 5 
50 and 
over 3 1 
In i860, 63.6% of all Georgian families owned no 
slaves at all, and 18% owned four or less, thus 81% 
of the families in i860 fell into the classification of 
3 
Randall and Donald, The Civil War and 
Reconstruction, pp.68-69. 
14 
small or non-slaveholders. Large planters, those with 
fifty or more slaves/ made up approximately 1.0?S of 
Georgia's white families, with the remaining 18$ of 
the white families owning five to nine slaves, and 
thereby being considered "substantial slaveholders". 
While the number of slaves and slaveowners had 
increased in the last ante-bellum years in Georgia, 
the large majority of families were not substantial 
slaveholders. They were owners of small farms, or were 
not a part of the agricultural population at all. Little 
has been written about this large segment of Georgia's 
population, and the studies that have concentrated on the 
small farmer have tended to be highly contradictory. 
One of the earliest travelers in Georgia in search 
of first-hand knowledge on the life and times of the 
common people was Frederick Law Olmsted. In A Journey 
in the Seaboard States, with Remarks on Their Economy, 
A Journey in the Back Country, A Journey Through Texas, 
and The Cotton Kingdom, Olmsted looked at the social 
and economic conditions of the southern people. 
Admidst a bountiful offering of personal opinion 
and conjecture, the author presented his views to the 
northern readers of the New York Daily Times. As the 
author traveled through the Georgia tidewater, 
upcountry, and piedmont region, he concluded that most 
citizens in similar social and economic conditions 
15 
throughout the south .were similar to the Georgians 
he observed, and thus equally fitted his general 
descriptions. 
The small farmers and pine barrens' "clay-eaters" 
were believed by Olrasted to be living in a condition 
that was the direct result of slavery. They were a 
degraded class that the author felt represented the 
majority of southern whites. His viewpoint was refined 
by one of his later disciples, George M. Weston, who 
stated that the poor whites not connected with slave 
ownership or management had been forced off all 
"lands susceptable of cultivation" and had been "thrown 
I 
back upon the sterile soils" where they lost all desire 
for a decent or productive life.** 
Olmsted's belief saw the large majority of Georgia^ 
citizens, the non-slaveholders, as powerless pawns in 
the politics of the plantation managers. As a result of 
their continual abuse, they hated the planters and 
their slaves. Olmsted interviewed a small farmer who 
wished 
their warn*t no niggers here. They are 
a great cuss to this country, I expect. 
But 'twouldn't do no good to free •emt 
that wouldn't do nohow!... I reckon the 
majority would be right glad if we could 
4         
The Poor Whites of the South (Washington, I856), 
p.5. 
16 
get rid of the niggers. But it would 
never do to free 'era and leave 'em here.5 
To Olmsted the plain folk feared and hated the blacks, 
hated them because they feared that "the niggers was 
risin" and would strike out at the poor whites. 
The author perceived a peculiar irony in the 
relationship of the poor whites to slavery. Although 
blacks were hated, the poor.whites gained in status 
by being white in a slave society. This self-defined 
status of the ruling class prevented many poor whites 
from engaging in "menial tasks". The author saw an 
absurd parallel to the philosophy of the tidewater 
aristocrat when he stated that 
to work industriously and steadily, 
especially under direction from another 
man, is in the Southern tongue "to 
work like a nigger", and from their 
childhood, the one thing that has made 
their life valuable to the mass of 
whites has been that niggers are yet 
their inferiors.° 
Even though the slaves were both hated and feared 
by the common folk of the south, Olmsted felt that 
they answered a social need for both the plain folk 
and the slaveholder. 
5 
Frederick Law Olmsted, The Cotton Kingdom, ed. 
by Arthur M. Schlesinger (New York, 1953), p.330. 
6 
Frederick Law Olmsted, The Slave States, ed. 
by Harvey Wish (New York, 1959T7~P.251. 
17 
Olmsted and his school called the large majority 
* 
of southern whites "white trash" and thought they were 
narrow-minded, rude, coarse, and dangerous. They were 
basically shiftless, and existed only by hunting, 
fishing., and stealing, battered from poor land to 
worse at the whim of the planter and slaveholder. They 
felt that the poor whites, with no real basis for 
self-respect, were able to tolerate their lives only 
by justifying their "whiteness"! they were not the 
lowest class in the south, they were white, and therefore 
of the ruling class. 
Later writers have challenged the Olmsted school 
for its elitist attitudes toward the non-slayeholding 
whites of the south. The most effective of these 
revisionists, Frank Lawrence Owsley, constructed The 
Plain Folk.of the Old South as a carefully defined 
defense of the small farmer and non-slaveholder. 
Basing his defense of the common people on tax 
records, county historical data, and the manuscript 
Census records, Owsley quickly challenged Olmsted's 
contention that the plain folk were mere squatters by 
showing that between sixty and seventy percent of the 
non-slaveholders in the south owned their own farms, 
the majority being fifty to two hundred acres in size.? 
7 
(Baton Rouge, 19^9), pp.8-9. 
18 
Owsley then proceeded to challenge Olmsted'a 
hypothesis that the plain folk were forced off their 
lands by the planters and slaveholders, and made to 
live non-agricultural lives. Owsley stated that the 
large majority of small landowners were never farmers 
at all, but in fact, were herdsmen. While he agreed 
that some poor folk had been forced off the better 
cotton lands by the slaveholders, he stated that they 
had not been driven from agricultural lives. 
To Owsley, the plain folk lived in the pine barrens, 
the hills and mountains, areas where their bountiful 
herds would not bother the agriculturalists. He felt 
that the casual observer of those wooded areas would 
not have noted the herds, and would have been led to 
believe that these families did not to support their 
lives except by hunting and fishing. 
Using data from the Seventh Census, Owsley showed 
that the south led the nation in livestock production, 
and stated that the plain folk were the producers,8 
The revisionist differed greatly with Olmsted on 
the relationship between the planter and the plain folk. 
He felt that 
the Southern folk were... a closely knit 
poeplej but they were not class conscious 
in a Marxian sense, for with rare exceptions 
8 
Owsley, The Plain Folk of the Old South', pp.141. 
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did they regard the planters and men 
of wealth as thdir oppressors. On the 
contrary, they looked with approval on 
their successj and they assumed... that 
the door of economic opportunity swung 
open easily to the thrust of their own 
ambitions." 
Owsley saw the southern folk dreaming of the day 
they would become planters, and thus identifying 
with the planter class. He saw pride and individuality 
in the plain folk, and felt they were vital to the 
politics of the day. He felt they controlled their 
own, and their state's, destinies. 
Historiography reveals two greatly opposed 
viewpoints on the freedom and power of the small 
farmers and non-slaveholders of the south. The histories 
of Georgia seem to indicate that the answer to the 
question of "who were the plain folk?" falls somewhere 
between both views. 
Since both schools of thought have tended to 
exaggerate the lives and numbers of small farmers 
and non-slaveholders, as well as to overstate the 
agrarian nature of the south, at least in reference 
to Georgia, it is necessary to establish a pattern 
for the common man in Georgia in the last decade of 
the ante-bellum period. While the pattern of slave 
ownership was established in TABLE ONE, the geographical 
9 
Owsley, The Plain Folk of the Old South, pp.141-2 
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was not. TABLE TWO clearly shows that although one 
a 
third of Georgia's rural white families lived in the 
pine barrens or mountain areas of the state, only 
\6.k%  of the slaveholding families resided in those 
sections of Georgia. 
TABLE TWO 
GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF SLAVEHOLDERS 
IN GEORGIA IN i860 
w 
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U                     <D G 0) 
rt                   +> «H cq 
P3                    <& rt 
£ +> M 
d>                   a> C o 
•H .H O r-l 
o< & s w 
% of Total White 
Population      7.0%    4.0%   36.1%   52.9% 
% of White Rural 
Familiesl0      5.6%    2.1%   21.1%        6b.6% 
% of White Slave- 
owning Families 26.3%   M,6%   18.9%   50.3% 
% of White Rural 
Slaveowhing 
Families       2?.6%   55.1%   16.1%   4?.6% 
% of Total Area 
Population That 
is Slave       25.6%   58.8%   19.1%   56.6% 
10 
As a basis of comparison, Georgia's twelve 
largest cities or towns were established and the 
eleven counties in which they were located were 
removed from calculations, being then considered urban 
areas, the balance being rural. The eleven counties 
werei Chatham, Clark, Richmond, Baldwin, Wilkes, 
DeKalb, Pike, Bibb, Troup, and Muscogee. 
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TABLE THREE indicates that nearly sixty percent 
of the farms in Georgia in i860 were smaller than 100 
acres. When it is considered that a typical land grant 
of the period was 160 acres, and that Owsley considered 
farms up to 200 acres as "small", it is apparent that 
the majority of Georgia's ante-bellum farmers were 
owners of very small acreage. 
TABLE THREE 
THE STATISTICAL DISTRIBUTION OF FARMS IN 
GEORGIA IN i86011 
Size of Farm       Number of Farms     Percentage 
of This Size        of all Farms 
Over 1,000 Acres 902 1.7# 
500 - 999 Acres 2,692 5.9% 
100 - 499 Acres 18,821 34.9% 
50 - 99 Acres ,     14,129 26.2% 
3-49 Acres 17,353 32.2# 
With approximately 110,000 white families in 
Georgia before the Civil War, only 53»897 owned farms 
of greater than three acres, only ^9.0%  of the families 
were farmowners in a predominantly agricultural state. 
The Eighth Census itemized 81,364 white males giving 
their occupations as farmers, yet only 66.2%  of these 
11 
Data from U. S. Census Office, The Eighth Census 















men could have owned their own farmsi the balance 
must have either been working the family farm, been 
tenants on the land of others, or been squatters. 
If all farms listed in the Eighth Census as less than 
100 acres were to be counted as the largest possible in 
their category, that is all farms in the 3-9 acre 
classification would be considered 9 acre farms, only 
2,160,220 acres of land would be accounted for. Yet, 
Georgia had 8,062,758 acres of developed farm land 
in i860, and over 18,000,000 acres of land yet to be 
utilized. Considering only developed farm land, small 
farms of one hundred acres or less accounted for less than 
one quarter of the farming acreage in the state. 
The plantation system during the 1850*s 
was not merely a major, but a growing 
element in the Southern economy. In 
terms of income, one thousand Southern 
families received over $50,000,000, while 
all the remaining families raceived only 
$60,000,000!... The planter had not merely 
more land than the yeomani he generally 
owned the more valuable land.12 
Georgia's situation of land distribution was similar 
to that described by William E. Dodd for the south 
as a whole in the late ante-bellum years. 
MAP TWO shows that the greatest concentrations of 
small farms were found in the mountains and pine barrens 
regions of the state. Between 60%  and 80$ of the farms 
in these areas were less than 100 acres in size in I860. 
12      ' 
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The tidewater counties areas were composed of 
b0%  to 60# small farms, yet the irregular geography 
of the coast and multiple ownership of small farms 
indicate that these areas were quite different from 
the small farm areas of the mountains and pine barrens. 
These farms were small only because of topographic 
limitations. 
The piedmont, oj» black belt, of Georgia averaged 
less than 60$ small farms, with a common range of 
0%-40?S, indicating that the larger, more successful, 
cotton planters were located in this area. A comparison 
of MAP ONE and MAP TWO indicates that areas of low 
numbers of small farms were areas of high slave densities, 
with the exception of the tidewater areas which have 
been mentioned. 
In ante-bellum Georgia the numbers of middle 
range landowners did not approach the 60^-70$ expected 
by Owsley. In fact, almost 80$ of the rural, white 
families owned no land, or owned small farms of less 
than 100 acres, hardly figures that give credence to 
the author's belief in a large, land-based class of 
common folk. While Georgia was agricultural, it was 
not agrarian in the sense Owsley meant by that term. 
TABLE FOUR, livestock production in Georgia in 
1850 and i860, demonstrates that the major livestock 
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productions of cattle, horses, and sheep dropped 10# 
to 20$ in the last ante-bellum decade. This could 
be justified by Frank Owsley*s stated belief in the 
movement of herdsmen to newer frontiers outside of the 
state, and thus a subsequent drop in production. However, 
MAP THREE, indicates that perhaps these areas were not 
Georgia's prime source of livestock at all. 
TABLE FOUR 
NUMBERS OF LIVESTOCK IN GEORGIA IN 1850 AND i86013 
1850 I860 
Horses 151,331       130,771 
Asses 57,379       101,069 
Milk Cows 33^,223       299,688 
Oxen 73,286        7^,W 
Sheep 560,^35 512,616 
Steers 690,019 631,707 
Pigs    - 2,168,617 2,i+88,l6l 
Swine, more than any other livestock, have 
been associated with the plain folk of the south. 
They were inexpensive, provided an excellent source 
of food, and required little care. They were often 
turned loose in the mountain areas of the state to 
forage for themselves. 
13 
Livestock fiqures taken from U. S. Census 
Bureau, 1850, The Seventh Census of the United States, 
18^0, pp. 378-379, and U. S. Census Bureau, i860, The 
EighthCensus of the United States, i860, Ag.. pp.22-30. 
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MAP THREE indicates that the mountain areas of 
the state had the lowest per capita swine production 
in Georgia in i860. Nowhere in the mountains did 
the figure pass twenty pigs per person, and the 
majority of the area fell into a category of 0-10 
pigs per white person. 
The tidewater counties, areas of marshes, flooded 
fields, and very low white populations, raised pigs 
in numbers similar to those found in the mountain areas. 
Both the pine barrens and the piedmont counties raised 
20-4-0 pigs per white Georgian. 
Although it could be concluded that the small 
farmers and non-slaveholders were the pig producers 
in the state, the two counties with the greatest pig 
production in the state were also the tv/o counties 
in the lowest category in reference to the percentage 
of small farms. Ware County, in the barrens, had only 
35.2?5 farms under 100 acres, and Lee County in the newer 
cotton area of southwest Georgia had only J&,1%  small 
farms. 
The comparison of MAP TWO, small farms, with MAP 
THREE indicates that the piedmont counties with the 
greatest number of small farms generally averaged 
20-30 pigs per white Georgian, while counties with less j 
small farms also fell in the same range of pigs. Thus, 
although small farms varied from 0%  to 60# of the total 
MAP THREE 
SWINE PER WHITE 
GEORGIAN 
number of farms, pig production would appear to have 
a 
been relatively consistent. Within the pine barrens, 
the greatest pig production areas were the areas of 
least small farms. 
Owsley's contention that the small farmers and 
plain folk were herdsmen, moving ahead of the frontier, 
does not seem to fully identify Georgia's situation. 
While many of the small farmers, in fact all farmers, 
did raise pigs for fpod and export in Georgia before 
the War, general livestock figures were falling. While 
a vast amount of mountain acreage was available for 
forage, pig production would seem to have been tied 
more intimately to the plantation system and to the 
institution of slavery. In fact, as small farms decreased, 
pig production often increased. 
All of Georgia's plain folk were not agricultural. 
The Seventh Census lists 10,859 men as "laborers", 
526 as "factory hands", and 12,625 in miscellaneous 
categories representing what would be today considered 
lower class trades occupations. Approximately 14,000 
white males listed their occupations in categories that 
today would be considered middle class trades or 
professions. Thus, approximately 21?S of the white, adult 
male population was "blue collar" and ljfo  "white 
collar", but more important was the fact that almost 
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35# of the population was not engaged in agricultural 
work directly. 
If the white, male adults owning 100-499 acres 
were to be considered middle class farmers, and this 
figure was added to those men engaged in middle class 
trades or occupations, it would be seen that only 
approximately 25%  of the white, adult males in Georgia 
in the last decade of the ante-bellum period were of 
middle economic status. Owsley*s contention of a large 
land-based or middle class population would not appear 
to be the case in Georgia. 
However, neither was Georgians great mass of 
whites the "poor white trash" detailed by Olmsted. 
In the pine barrens, most often seen as an area 
inhabited by "clay-eaters", 70%  of the white families 
owned their own farms, and most produced a small crop 
of rice. Perhaps the balance of the families in the 
area came close to Olmsted*s description! suffering 
from ringworm and malaria, they existed on the most 
basic of diets, supplemented by ample supplies of 
home -distilled alcohol that seemed to assuage the 
effects of their diseases. 
Also not to be classed as "poor white trash" 
were the "}5%  of the state's population that lived in 
the mountains of the state. 
The mountain whites were often classed with 
31 
the poor whites, but the majority 
belonged to a different category. They 
have been described as "stranded 
frontiersmen" who remained in their 
isolated mountain valleys while the 
westward movement passed them by. The 
mountaineers...were brave, manly, and 
selfrespecting.... In their patriarchal 
families a Spartan way of life was 
observed.... Like the pine woods poor 
whites, they had a prejudice against the 
Negro and showed little enthusiasm 
for freeing him.l4 
Only 44.7$ of the family heads in the mountains 
owned their own farms, but their family structure 
tended to hold the sons at home, and many did not 
engage in agriculture at all due to the varied 
topography they lived on. Many did exist as hunters 
and trappers, living lives we today associate with 
the mountain men of Tennessee, but they were not 
the shiftless folk Olmsted drew. 
The last group of plain folk were those that were 
spread throughout the piedmont of Georgia. Many owned 
their own small farms, approximately one third.of the. 
families not owning large farms, but many more were 
tenants on farms, or worked in associated trades or 
commercial enterprises. The numbers of non- farmowners 
increased in the older cotton areas where greater 
populations were found and where commercial or trade 
centers existed. Most of the small farmers in the area 
• 14 
Eaton,  The Growth of Southern Civilization. 
1790-1860  (New York,  1961),  ppTlTT^JZ. 
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grew small cotton crops, and many, to be sure, looked 
to the day that they could own more land and slaves. 
It is a mistake to equate the landless 
group among the rural population with 
the poor whites. Although a lack of 
property was a characteristic of the 
poor whites, there were many among the 
landless who could not be properly so 
classified. Among those were the renters 
or tenants who had no slaves but land, 
and vice versa. Sharecroppers, woodcutters, 
agricultural laborers, and overseers 
belonged to this group; some were poor 
whites, others were not.... An economic 
definition of status omits an important 
psychological difference between the 
poor whites and the poor yeoman farmers. 
The latter had pride and respectability, 
even if they were poor....15 
The great mass of small farmers and landless 
lower classes were "respectable" in ante-bellum 
Georgia. A great number were interested in the affairs 
of the day, and they were actively courted by the 
politicians of the period. 
15 
Eaton, The Growth of Southern Civilization, 
1790-1860. pp. r&"9-170. 
16 
See Owsley, The Plain Folk of the Old South,pp. 
142j Eaton, The Growth of Southern Civilization, 1?90- 
1860, pp.172-176j Bryan, Confederate Georgiaj pp.9-ll» 
Randall and Donald, The Civil War and Reconstruction, 
pp.29-30j Craven, The Growth of Southern Nationalism, 
1843-1861. pp. 345-348", and Mary Boykin Chesnut, A 
Diary from Dixie (Cambridge, Mass., 1905), p.25. 
It should be noted that 97% of the heads of families, 
or 80,8% of the white, male adults voted in the i860 
presidential election, indicating keen interest among 
all the population in political actions. 
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Although they did not control even a moderate 
share of the wealth of their state, and very rarely 
had money of their own, the plain folk of Georgia 
lived from the land and hoped for the future. Olmsted 
would have dismissed well over half of Georgia's 
ante-bellum population as "poor white trash", and Owsley 
would have elevated far too many. 
The writers of the period of the New 
Deal tended to exaggerate their prosperity 
.... With gusto they described the large 
measure of self-sufficiency, the delicious 
country food, and the pure water, and the 
wholesome amusements of the yeoman.... 
Absent from this picture was the low 
standard of most yeoman, a monotonous 
diet of hog, hominy, and coffee in the 
winter, the provincialism and lack of 
education of the majority... the lack 
of convienences that Northern farmers 
enjoyed, and the chronic lack of money.17 
While the plain folk of Georgia controlled barely 
25$ of the cultivated land, while they had little cash 
and many were often unhealthy and uneducated, they 
were not in large "poor white trash." They were the 
largest section of the electorate, and no political 
action was possible without their support. Up until 
the final election before the War, the politicians 
tried to accomodate issues to their needs and their 
philosophies. 
17 
Fabian Linden, "Economic Democracy in the 
Southi an Appraisal of Some Recent Views," quoted in 





GEORGIA'S TIDEWATER ARISTOCRACY i APPROXIMATING A 
SOUTHERN IDEAL 
The lifestyles of Georgia's tidewater plantation 
owners came close to approximating the Old South of  ^ 
romantic myth. The inhabitants of the ricelands had, 
within five generations, developed a distinct society. 
It was a culture characterized by absentee owners and 
a disdain for "menial" or manual labor. It was a sodality 
that enjoyed, at times even worshipped, the romanticism 
of a past age, and attempted to recreate that era for 
itself. The tidewater planter 
stood at the top of a stratified society, 
cherishing the country-gentleman ideal - 
his lordly sense of leadership fed by 
the presense of slaves. His code demanded 
courtesy, deference to women, hospitality 
to strangers, defense of his honor, 
.consideration of social inferiors.* 
The basis of the coastal society was a crop with 
a limited area of culture. Unlike upland cotton which 
grew nearly everywhere in Georgia, rice was restricted 
in its areas of growth by ecological needs that 
demanded that it be grown within the reach of rivers 
and streams. Most effective in meeting the needs of 
1 
Rollin G, Osterweis, Romanticism and Nationalism 
iH *h!L  Old South (New Haven, 19^9), p.17. . 
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the crop was that area no more than twenty-five miles 
from the coast that was drained by fresh streams 
influenced by tidal cycles. 
With sea island cotton, rice was first grown on 
the islands directly off the coast of South Carolina 
and Georgia, and quickly spread to the areas directly 
inland. Fields were selected that lay above the reach 
of low tide, for occasional strong currents could have 
brought the salt water wedge onto the fields. Salt water 
encroachment would not only have killed the crop, it 
would have rendered the soil sterile until percolation 
carried the salt below cultivated depths. 
With fields selected, the many availible slaves 
proceeded to construct dikes surrounding the fields. 
The levees, on an average fifteen feet wide and five 
to six feet in height, often enclosed fields of 50- 
200 acres. The levees were equipped with sophisticated 
double lock systems which, when opened on the river, 
side, flooded the fields at high tide, and drained them 
during low tide. 
Rows of seeds were planted, and the fields were 
flooded for several weeks to fertilize and weed the 
plots. The process was repeated twice more, the final 
flooding being necessary to float the heavy heads of 




Upon draining the fields for the final time, the 
slaves harvested the crop with hand and sickle and 
carried it to the mill where the exterior hull was 
removed and the grains polished. The treated crop was 
placed in barrels and sent to Savannah or Charleston 
for marketing. 
The cultivation of rice was not a project for the 
casual farmeri exact timing was necessary in the flooding 
of fields to prevent rot» levees were often broken by- 
floods or animal burrowsj locks and sluice gates needed 
constant attention, as did the intricate channels that 
led into the main levees. A large, attentive, labor 
force was necessary for the endless details of rice 
agriculture. Slaves provided that force. 
Since a large labor pool was the foundation of 
rice culture, it was in the tidewater areas of the 
state that Georgians first became totally dependent on 
the institution. In none of the coastal areas where rice 
was cultivated did the number of ante-bellum whites 
approach the numbers of slaves, and only in coastal 
Georgia, South Carolina, and Mississippi did blacks 
approach 90%  of the total population. In the summer 
months when the white owners vacationed elsewhere, 
leaving only the white overseers and mechanics to run 
their plantations, blacks slaves were almost the only 
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residents of the tidewater. 
Those months of owner absence were most important 
in the development of the tidewater society. They were 
not, at first, social diversions, but were based on 
a real physical threat to the health of the coastal 
residents. The Greenville (Mississippi) Times reported 
late one ante-bellum fall 
A big white frost last Monday morning 
was a glorious sight for our people to 
see. To those within the infected districts 
it was a token of rescue and restj to 
those who were shut off from their homes 
it was an assurance that their exile 
would soon be over.... With what agony 
of heart the White robes of the blessed 
frost was watched and prayed for, none 
can know save those who passed the 
fearful hours within the death-haunted 
districts.2 
Yellow fever had again3 raged through the swamps and 
tidelands during the summer months. Malaria, less 
deadly and more common, had also given its chills and 
fevers to many residents of  the coast. All the bonfires 
of prevention^" could not free the coastal residents 
2 
Cohn, The Life and Times of King; Cotton, p.55. 
3 
Ulrich Bonnell Phillips mentions in Life and Labor 
in the Old South (Boston, 1929), pp. 175ff.. that there 
were i cholera epidemics in 1833, 18^9, 1852, 185^, and 
1856i typhoid epidemics in 1811j serious smallpox 
outbreaks in 1859 and I860j a measles epidemic in 1858, 
and yellow fever and malaria outbreaks throughout the 
tidewater every summer until the first frost of winter. 
Bonfires were lit throughout the summer months in 
the hope that they would drive off the cause of the 
disease, the deadly "miasma", and evil swamp wind. 
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of their endemic diseases. 
In the tidewater, as soon as residents were 
economically able, they fled to the uplands of the 
state or to Savannah or Charleston to avoid the summer 
months in the swamps. "They went to New York, and 
Newport, and Saratoga, and Cape May, and Seneca Lake — 
somewhere they can display themselves worse than they 
do here."5 Usually the residents spent the warmer months 
in Charleston or Savannah where they developed a society 
that came to be the epitome of the " plantation 
aristocracy". 
Absentee ownership became the rule, not the 
exception, after a few generations of rice and sea 
island cotton production. For six or seven months each 
year the aristocrats were "forced" to live the urbane 
life of their adopted cities. Commenting on the 
plantations, Paul W. Gates stated that 
Absentee ownership, with its pressure 
for profit, tended to exaggerate the 
evils of the southern staple economy! 
the concentration upon one crop, mining 
the soil, failure to build up a sturdy 
yeoman-farmer base, and a dependence upon 
slave labor. The narrowly concentrated 
profits permitted a very few planters 
the luxury of fine homes... in Charleston, 
staffed with numerous domestic slaves, 
5 
Olmsted, The Slave States, ed. Harvey Wish, 
p.185. 
kO 
and the social prestige which all the 
realism of a later generation has not 
removed from the memory of man.° 
Perhaps the absentee ownership cycle reached 
the logical climax in the case of Pierce Butler. Butler 
and his brother owned huge plantations along the 
Altamaha River of coastal Georgia. Butler's Island 
and estates on St. Simon's Island were rich sources 
of profits from sea island cotton and rice culture. 
Butler carried his summer travel to the extreme and 
established Philadelphia as his permanent address, 
ouily occasionally visiting his southern estates. 
Butler had changed a great deal from the customs 
of the early inhabitants of the tidewater. They had 
been busy in the production of indigo, sea island cotton, 
and rice, and were not so afraid of disease as to risk 
making their fortunes, and they were not too proud 
to talk of, and deal with, money. They were basically, 
and saw themselves as, businessmen. One agricultural 
writer felt that 
rice is yet the grand staple production 
.., and that for which the planters 
neglect the healthy, pleasant back 
country in order to live in the Dismals 
on the coast,,.. The common computation 
throughout the provinces is communibus 
annis, that each working hand employed 
by a rice plantation, makes four barrels 
and a half of rice,... But as this would 
6 
The Farmer's Agei Agriculture 1815-1860 ( New 
York, I9S0), p.133. 
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by no means pay .the planter for his 
expenses and time, he makes a shift to 
save something in the articles of 
overseers and clothing.7 
The early planters were willing to reduce their luxuries 
and to oversee their own estates in order to generate 
profits. 
The later planters were quite satisfied to run 
their lands from a distance, a safe distance in warm 
months, and to allow others to actually direct the 
labor of their slaves. 
The running of a large rice plantation was a 
substantial undertaking in the late ante-bellum years. 
The minimal investment required for land, slaves, 
and service buildings on a small estate has been 
estimated at $50,000, while larger ones could easily 
have involved sums as large as $500,000. When it is . 
considered that field slaves were sold for between 
$800 and $1,500 in the late ante-bellum years, it is 
easily seen that a typical rice plantation with 50-100 
slaves would have been valued in the hundreds of thousands 
of dollars.8 
Rice estates were large business enterprises, and 
7 
American Husbandry reprinted by Aubrey C. Land.ed., 
Bases of the Plantation Society (Columbia, S.C.,1969),p, 
8~j: 
8 
Gates, The Farmer's A^ei Agriculture 1815-1860, 
pp. 119ff., and Phillips, Life and Labor in the. Old 
South, pp. 255ff. Also Eaton, The Growth of Southern 
Civilization, 1790-1860, pp.lOlff. 
were run for a profit. They were basically capitalistic 
institutions, yet the late ante-bellum planters were 
"capitalists who disliked capitalism'.' .9 They spent their 
days attempting to ignore their estates and the general. 
management of them. "The more disdainful patricians 
never escaped the suspicion that enthusiastic plantation 
management smacked of Yankee practicality.... The 
deeper the planter fell into debt, the more strenuously 
he kept up the grand style, as if to conceal his 
embarrassment by a showy display.10 
The frantic attempt to detatch oneself from 
the care and economy needed to manage adequately one's 
estate demonstrated the dichotomy that deeply engaged 
the psyche of the tidewater planter. He often detested 
the very system that he represented, and a refusal to 
face reality became a part of his cultural values. 
While many authors indicate that the cotton planters 
took pride in their business and managerial duties, 
9 
The phrase is from William W. Freehling, Prelude 
to Civil Wari The Nullification Controversy in South 
Carolina","1816-1836~1 New York. 1965),   (hereinafter Prelude 
to Civil War), p. 35. Freehling deals with the rice 
planters of South Carolina* however, the common family 
lines, intermarriages, sources of supply, and vacation 
resorts tended to create a rice aristocracy that crossed 
state and political lines to create a common philosophy. 
10 
Freehling, Prelude to Civil War, p.35. 
*3 
Hugh S. Legare sumraad up the attitude of the rice planters 
when he stated that to them 
the town bourgeoisie is so odious.... 
Alfred Huger's remark always occurs 
to me that the greatest absurdity in 1t 
the world is a "Liverpool Gentleman."1 
No man, therefore, actively engaged in business was 
a gentleman, for gentlemen did not have to consider 
money. 
The children of the planters went into the "genteel 
professions" of law, medicine, teaching, or the ministry 
when there was no possibility of managing their father's 
estates. As the ante-bellum period drew to a close, the 
professions in the south were crowded with the sons and 
grandsons of the aristocracy, and many were forced to 
pass their days in idle leisure, for aristocrats could 
never engage in manual or menial labor.12 
11 
Freehling, Prelude to Civil War, p.13. 
12 
U.S.Census Bureau, 7th Census, 1850, Compendium 
of the Seventh Census, ed., J.D.B. DeBow, yields the 
following occupational datai 
STATE      PERCENTAGES OF WHITES AND FREE BLACKS 
ENGAGED IN THE FOLLOWING PROFESSIONS 
Doctors  Lawyers  Clergymen  Teachers 
Georgia 0.25# 0.13# 0.1395 0.25% 
So. Carolina 0.30% 0.11% 0.11?S 0.26% 
Pennsylvania 0.17$ 0.10% 0.12# 0.15# 
New York 0.16% 0.13^ 0.13# 0.09# 
As can be seen, Georgia and South Carolina had far more 
doctors and teachers than would be expected in such 
basically non-urban states. 
4if 
The dislike of physical labor led many planters 
to look down on whites not of their social class. The 
mechanics, the shopkeepers, the skilled laborers, all 
competed with slaves in the eyes of many tidewater 
planters. They were relegated to the lowest white social 
standing. 
The only non-professional occupation acceptable 
to_ the planters, and that from sheer necessity , was 
that of overseer. Needed by the planter to enable his 
spring and summer pilgrimages, the overseer was 
tolerated as a necessary part of the "disagreable 
business" of plantation management. While many overseers 
in the cotton counties would ultimately attain planter 
status, few, if any, would do so in the tidewater. Rice 
farming was just not open to the enterprising young 
man with a few slaves and a great deal of ambition. 
It was possible to buy inferior land, and to raise rice, 
as was done in many poorer areas of the pine barrens by 
small farmers, but it was impossible to become an 
"aristocrat" without marrying into an established family, 
or waiting for several generations of wealth to bring 
respectability. 
The economics of the system prevented the entrance 
of the poor or small farmers into its ranks. Because 
of this fact, the small farmers were never considered 
^5 
potential social equals, and thus this element of the 
population was not given the deference that was 
occasionally given in the cotton areas of the state. 
The rice system was a closed culture, and it had little 
or no regard for those outside its structure, 
Ulrich Bonnell Phillips commented on the dread 
that a typical aristocrat, George Noble Jones, experienced 
after returning from one of his frequent trips to 
Rhode Island and Switzerland. Jones had to bypass the 
pleasures of Charleston and Savannah in order to spend 
some time with the dull and poorly conversant people 
on his plantations in Georgia. 
Upon these visits he doubtless experienced 
at the hands of his overseers and their 
wives what a Savannah friend described as 
" the peculiar horror of country life, that 
of keeping company all day with the onus 
of talking thrown upon me'.'.13 
It must have been a great ordeal, talking with one's 
plantation help, when one was used to the brilliance 
of conversation in the summer capitals of the ricelands. 
The management of one's land became a chore to be 
resented and dreaded. 
The newspapers of the time discussed the situation 
in a typically introspective manner. 
We are somehow given to regard all 
labors which employ time, and compel 
exertion as inconsistent with a proper 
13 
Life and Labor in the Old South, p.268, 
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gentility. NOBLE BLOOD will not trade in 
merchandise  - can'it be expected that 
noble blood will sow and reap, and divise 
modes and means by which the arts of 
sowing and reaping shall be... improved.,.? 
And you will never see the plow drawn 
upon the panel of a planter's coach, 1**. 
This denial of the source of one's wealth was 
illustrated in the comments of John Couper of St. 
Simon's Island, Georgia, after most of his inland 
cotton lands were sold due to bankruptcyi 
I am satisfied and relieved from much 
anxiety. By this event neither my standing 
in society - nor my mode of living have 
suffered any change.15 
Couper sold his cotton lands in the piedmont, but 
preserved his ricelands on St, Simon's Island. It 
appears that the aristocrat did not have the slightest 
intention of looking for, or correcting, the cause 
of his failure. His image had been maintained on the 
coast, and thus no serious loss had been suffered. 
The summers in Savannah, Charleston, and other 
cities the aristocrats visited, came close to the myth 
of the "magnolias and moonlight" lifestyle. Men and 
women worked to become characters from Sir Walter Scott 
14- 
Southern Agriculture, IX (July, 1836) quoted in 
Freehling, "Prelude 'to dviT War, p.14. 
15 
John Couper to James Couper, quoted in Thomas 
Govan, "Was Plantation Slavery Profitable," The Journal 
of Southern History, VIII, number ^ (November, "19^2) ,p.'45, 
^7 
novel.3. Hospitality and gentility were fine arts to 
be cultivated and treasured, if not demanded. Edmund 
Ruffin, strong advocate of industrial and agricultural 
reform in the south, bemoaned the lack of progressive 
reform in the tidewater and credited the cult of 
hospitality with draining the aristocrats of time and 
energy. 
The main cause of lowland adversity, said 
he, "is that which is our greatest boast and 
pride at home, and the continued theme of praise 
abroad - the hospitality of old Virginia... 
it is our custom to give to all visitors, 
not only the best entertainment, but also 
the time, the employments, and the habits of 
our hosts - and this not only for friends 
and visitors whose company is pleasing and 
desirable but for every individual of 
the despicable race of loungers and 
spongers which our custom of hospitality 
has created.1" 
Hospitality was gladly given, and custom demanded 
only that the recipient remain within an accepted 
standard of gentility. Discussions and "fine talk" 
were a necessity at every gathering, but too strong 
an argument, or the slightest hint of sarcasm, were 
considered affronts to the honor of the host. Pride 
was the ultimate defense in a style of life built 
upon an illusion of reality. 
Duels were common in ante-bellum Georgia ( the 
Savannah Anti-Dueling Association was formed by clergy 
16 
Phillips, Life and Labor in the Old South, p.356. 
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in 1826 to prevent the custom Jand were a major 
part of the Code of Honor, The Code required 
a relaxed cordiality in the drawing room.... 
And the affable talk at tea parties never 
hid the possibility of a duel. The great 
social art was to slip, without ostentation 
into an easy familiarity with all 
companions. The besetting social sin was 
to take advantage of the relaxed 
cordiality. The balance often broke down. 
A jest which went a bit too far could 
be taken as an insult, a clever argument 
could be interpreted as an affront. Then 
came the inevitable challenge and often 
the tragic duel.17 
In spite of themselves, the rice planters never 
faced the constant economic uncertainty so common in 
the cotton areas of the state. While there were 
occasional bankruptcies in the tidewater, these were 
generally caused by the extravagance and show, and not 
by declining prices or smaller yields. In spite of 
disease, the initial large investment, the absentee 
ownership, and the general lack of concern, rice was 
"a much more certain crop than cotton, liable to few 
diseases, less likely to be seriously affected by 
physical causes, and but seldom subject to ruinous 
fluctuations."18 
South Carolina began to lose its hold on the 
17 
Freehling, Prelude to Civil War, p.12. 
18 
The Southern Patriot quoted in Freehling, 
Prelude to Civil Wa"r, pp.35-36. 
*9 
rice market in the 1850's. Siltation of lowland fields 
caused by massive soil erosion in upland areas began 
to take its toll in rice production. South Carolina 
had produced ?kf»  of the Nation's rice in 1850. but 
one decade later this figure had dropped to 63$ of the 
total. Georgia's share of the crop had increased from 
12%  to 28$ during the same period. The new lands 
opened for production in Georgia during the 1850's 
were far more fertile than South Carolina's heavily 
used lands, and the Georgia rice plantations continued 
to grow in spite of their owner's common neglect. 
It was not only the constancy of the crop that 
yielded a sense of security to the tidewater planters} 
the initial investment in slaves - the highest such 
investments in the south - yielded continual capital 
gains in the late ante-bellum years. While few cotton 
planters had "excess" slaves, many planters in the 
coastal areas sold slaves to the newer cotton areas 
in the western counties of the state. In spite of the 
very high mortality rate among tidewater slaves*", their 
19        
Eaton The Growth of Southern Civilization, pp. 
6O-63, 66-69, 108-llOj Kenneth M. Starnpp, The Peculiar 
Institution (New York, 1956), pp. 320ff. ,• Lewis C. Gray, 
"Economic Efficiency and Competitive Advantages of 
Negro Slavery Under the Plantation System," in Hugh G.J. 
Aitken, ed., Did Slavery Pay?(Boston, 1971), pp.76-?8| 
Alfred H. Conrad and~John R. Meyer, "The Economics of 
Slavery in the Antebellum South," in Aitken, Did Slavery 
Pay?, pp. 1^0-142. 
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reproductive rate assured an adequate, and occasionally, 
overly adequate, supply of new labor. Slaves were rented 
out during winter months to small manufacturers and 
tradesmen, thus providing an additional supply of 
cash income. 
In spite of what appeared to be the most stahle 
and financially sound area of Georgia's economy and 
culture, the rice aristocrats had one major problem. 
M.I. Manigault, a son of South Carolina aristocrats 
who had moved to Georgia ricelands in the middle 
of the I830*s, wrote to his brother of that concerni 
William Heyward is going to Solkhope in 
a few days to see how things are going 
on there & he confessed to me that he 
hated to have anything to do with Negroes, 
but thinks it will please his father.20 
The disease that originally had driven the white 
planters from the swamps each summer had not only 
removed them from their lands, it had removed them 
from contact with their labor. Unlike the small farmers 
and planters in the piedmont who worked with their slaves, 
the rice planters delegated that responsibility to 
their overseers. While exhibiting the usual "paternalism" 
with their house servants21-, they wanted, and had, little 
20 
M.I. Manigault to Henry Manigault in Freehling, 
Prelude to Civil War, p.14. 
2T 
James H. Hammond, "Slavery in the Light of 
Political Science", in E.N.Elliott, ed.. Cotton is King 
and Other Pro-Slavery Arguments  (Augusta, Ga., l8~60) ,p. 
649. Also, Chesnut, A Diary from Dixie, p.199, and 
James C. Bonner, "Genesis of Agricultural Reform in 
the Cotton Belt," The Journal of Southern History. IX 
(November, 1943), pp. 480-491. 
51 
to do with their field slaves. This lack of knowledge, 
lack of experience, combined with the overwhelming 
numbers of the black residents of the tidewater, led 
to a genuine fear of the slaves and of slave revolt. 
It led to an everpresent sense of fear and melancholy 
that seemed to permeate the ricelands. 
Ah, why should such a happy state of 
things - a society so charming and 
accomplished - be doomed to end so 
soon, and perhaps, so terribly!... 
My heart sinks within me often when 
I think of what too soon may be.22 
The tidewater aristocracy was a society that 
seemed to be aware that it could no longer exist within 
the value structure of the rest of the Nation. Men 
were living their lives based on values that were part 
of a past age. They based their culture on a refusal 
to face the reality of their economic condition and 
the basis of their labor force. 
In the face of opposition to their life styles, 
they came to believe that their way of life was the 
"golden age" of civilized development, and that it 
represented the best of human development. The defense 
of their values gave way to an offensive position, 
that demanded at the very least, a perpetuation of 
their way of life. 
22 
Hugh S. Legare in Freehling, Prelude to Civil 
War, p.15. 
5~ 
That the tidewater arts and literature were 
unaccomplished, that the aristocrats created a culture 
which denied its basis of support, that the planters 
refused reality did not matteri they believed in their 
system. It was a stable society of affluent slave- 
holders, and like all closed systems, when challenged, 
it reacted with passion. When the north finally became 
a force perceived as being capable of destroying their 
way of life, the north had to be removed from a 
position of influence over their lives. 
To justify her social situation, she 
had to disprove and refute the whale 
social, ethical, political, and economic 
philosophy of the day, which had arisen 
to support and justify societies based 
on a wholly different set of social 
relations.23 
The rice society was the height of southern 
aristocracy, and it became the greatest defender of 
the "southern way of life'.'. 
23 
Eugene Genovese, The World the Slaveholders Made 




COTTON AND GEORGIAN SOCIETY 
The myth of the southern plantation glorifies 
the owner in the field, supervising hundreds of slaves 
as they picked the cotton on thousands of acres of 
beautiful red soil. That viewpoint falls short of 
the reality in ante-bellum Georgia, however, where 
the greatest crop in later years was rice, and the 
field supervisor in all probability was not the owner, 
who was off in Charleston or Savannah. Georgia's 
greatest slaveowners were the masters of the rice 
estates, the most impressive of the southern farms. 
In i860 only 31 Georgians owned more than 200 slaves, 
and only, eight more than 300 j twenty of the first 
group, and six of the latter , were rice planters. 
The large majority of Georgia's cotton planters 
were not large slaveowners before the War. Approximately 
1300 families owned more than 50 slaves {X.Z%  of the 
families) in i860, and were considered part of the 
"planter class". Only 21.4# of the families owned more 
than five slaves, the minimum necessary to be thought 
of as even a moderately large slaveholder. Almost 60% 
of the state's farms were of less than 100 acres, and 
54 
only 6,7% were over 500 acres, large enough to be 
thought of as substantial cotton plantations, Georgia 
was not dominated by large, slaveholding, cotton 
planters before the Civil War. 
Unlike rice agriculture, however, anyone in the 
piedmont area of the state was able to grow cotton 
without serious difficulties in methods or a large 
outlay for slaves and land development. 
Georgia's earliest settlers had planted long- 
staple cotton in the tidewater areas of the state. 
Sea island cotton, the finest of American cotton due 
to its. long silken fibers, was easily extracted from 
its black seeds by use of the European treadle gin. 
The long staple cotton, although produced in small 
quantities - a prime hand could pick only 25 to 1001 
pounds a day in contrast to 200 daily pounds for upland 
cotton, was extremely profitable due to the high yearly 
2 yields and consistently stable, higher prices. 
1 
Gates, The Farmers Agei Agriculture I8lj - 
1860. p.132. 
2 
Francis Anne Kemble, Journal on a Residence on 
a
 Georgia Plantation in 183S-J839. ed. John A. Scott 
TNew York, 196T), pp. xxxvm, xxxix, 202-203. Also, 
Freehling, Prelude to Civil War, pp.35-36, notes that 
sea island cotton prices averaged 2 1/2 times the prices 
of upland cotton. 
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The early importance of sea island cotton waned 
in the third decade of the nineteenth century. Lands 
were no longer as responsive to the culture as continued 
farming brought a drop in soil fertility,,yet the 
geographical range of the sea island cotton was limited 
to the coastal areas of the state. As the areas of 
suitable acreage decreased, rice became the staple of 
the tidewater. 
Unlike those of long staple cotton, green seed 
cotton had short fibers that clung tenaciously to the 
seeds. The European treadle gin was incapable of the 
separation of fibers from seeds, necessitating long 
and tedious hours of manual separation. Early planters 
of upland cotton doubted their ability to make the 
crop economically advantageous. Acres of cotton were 
often plowed under at the end of the growing season 
due to the inability of the slaves to clean the crop 
before it rotted. Few men foresaw the dynamic expansion 
of the crop that would be made possible by the invention 
of the cotton gin by Whitney in 1793. 
With the invention of the gin, production^spread 
quickly throughout the upland areas, and sales rapidly 
rose.-' The fertile fields along the SaVanhah River were 
3 
The cotton crop in 179^ was 8,000,000 pounds, and 
in 1799 had increased to 20,000,000; mostly the increase 
was due to upland cotton. From Elliott, Cotton is King 
and Other Pro-Slavery Arguments, p. 250ff. 
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plowed and the yeafr's crop taken to market in 
Savannah or Charleston. New borderlands were opened, 
as white and pink blossoms spelled prosperity wherever 
they were found. Georgia's excellent soil and climate 
seemed to be ideal for cotton production and the 
sudden economic advantages offered by the bulk of the 
land in the state brought about a new attitude of 
optimism. 
In the last three decades before the Civil 
War the driving ambitious men of the 
cotton country must have felt that almost 
anything was possible for. them. They were 
hell-bent to grow cotton.^" 
The cotton growers of Georgia in the 1830's were 
frontiersmen in many ways, for " cotton is a frontier 
crop restlessly seeking new horizons, and new soil 
and climate ... favorable to it".^ They cleared their 
lands, took profits from the virgin soil, and many 
moved on to newer lands and better profits. 
Gradually, at first unnoticeably, the harvests 
had decreased, and the gullies formed by topsoil runoff 
grew larger. By the third decade of the nineteenth 
century, farmers in the northeast piedmont began to 
look at the new lands in the western and southwestern 
areas of the state. Where lands were inhabited by 
4 
Cohn, Life and Times of King Cotton, p.117. 
Conn, Life and Times of King Cotton, p.171. 
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Indians, the Indians had to be removed to make way 
for agricultural pursuits.( MAP FIVE). 
Planters in new lands tried to settle in areas 
such as they had known^, yet they carried with them 
the methods they had used in the old agricultural 
areas. Planters in the areas losing population felt 
competition from the newer lands and were forced to 
clear newer lands and expand their operations to 
produce greater yields, or, move on themselves.7 
Owsley, The Plain Folk of the Old South, p.23. 
7 
The mobility associated with cotton farming 
was not unique; mobility was common throughout the 
nation and certainly in agricultural areas. However, 
it was at its greatest in the southern states, and 
within Georgia, highest in the piedmont cotton areas. 
The-following data, derived from the U.S. Census Bureau, 
7th Census, i850, Compendium of the Seventh Census, 
ed., J. D. B. DeBow, pp. 16^17, 212-213, and 366, 
demonstrate that by 1850 there was a definite movement 
towards the deep south and southwestern cotton states. 
It also shows that by I85O, 23,5$ of Georgia's native 
population had relocated to neighboring states. 
Regional Nativities 
Region i»  of Region's Native Population 







Abuse of the land became an economic necessity, a basic 
part of the system, so much so that an agricultural 
writer felt that 
the planter scarcely considers land as part 
of his permanent investment. It is rather 
part of his current expenses .... He buys 
land, he uses it until it is exhausted, and 
then sells it ... for whatever it will 
bring .... It is something to be worn out, 
not improved.... The period of its use is 
incorporated into the original purchase, 
and the price is regulated accordingly.8 
7 (continued) 
State Nativi ties 
State • * of Population * of All State 
Native to State Natives Still in 
the State 
N, Carolina 96.3% 66.3* 
S. Carolina 95.6% 58.4* 
Virginia 94.3* 69.2* 
Maryland 91. 3* 75.8* 
Kentucky 81.255 70.0* 
Georgia 75.7% 76.6% 
Alabama 56.6% 74.0* 
Mississippi 48.4J6 81.7* 
Florida 45.4?S 81.2* 
Arkansas 39.4* 85.*2* 
Texas 35.9* 95.2* 
Of the 23.5* relocated Georgians, 71.4* had settled 
in Florida, Alabama, and Mississippi, all neighbors 
of the "Empire State of the South". 
8 
C. W, Howard, editor of the Marietta South 
Countryman, an agricultural periodical, in Cohn, 
The Life and Times of King Cotton, p,49.Also, Conrad 
and Meyer, "Economics* of Slavery "in the Antebellum 
South", in Aitken, Did Slavery Pav?, pp. 141-145 t  and, 
Bonner,"Genesis of Agricultural Reform in the Cotton 
Belt", The Journal of Southern History, IX (November, 
1943), pp. 475-477. 
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MAP FIVE 
MAJOR INDIAN TRSATI5S 
AND LAND PURCHASES - 
(ALL INDIANS REMOVED 
BY 1838 ) 
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This policy of use and abandonment of the land could 
not have existed without a source of available and 
inexpensive land. Land was cheap in Georgia until the 
middle of the nineteenth century. Between 1802 and 
1844 almost thirty million acres of land were taken 
from the Indians and distributed to the whites through 
generous land lotteries. "Indicative of Georgia's 
liberal land policy ...Cwagl the fact that twenty-five 
percent of the original grants were never taken up 
and had to be given away a second time."9 
There can be no question that the extensive 
and inexpensive lands made it economically advantageous 
to employ a system that had as its base the need to 
cut down and cripple forrest lands and 
cultivate them, with the sole view of the 
large annual profits until they will not 
pay' for cultivation, cut down more lands, and 
remove them field to field, and tract to 
tract, leaving the exhausted fields to 
grow up in pine timber, and to reclaim 
themselves,i0 
Some Georgians saw problems in the system, as 
did Pierce Butler's wife on St. Simon's Island. She 
wrote to a friend that 
the man who can move a gang of able bodied 
9 
Enoch M. Barks, Economics of Land Tenure in 
Georgia (New York, 190377~P1°7T&"-20\ 
10 
J.S. Whitten, Comm. of Patents for Georgia, in 
Gates, The Farmer's Agei Agriculture 1815-1860, p.142. 
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Negroes to a 'tract of virgin soil is sure 
of an immense return of wealth; as sure as 
that he who is circumscribed in this respect, 
and limited by the cultivation of certain 
lands with cotton or tobacco by slaves, will 
in the course of a few years see his 
estate gradually exhausted and unproductive 
.... The steady decrease of the value of 
your cotton crops, even on the famous sea 
island plantations of Georgia, often 
suggested to me the inevitable ruin of the 
owners within a certain ... space of time, 
as the land became worn out, and as the 
Negroes continued to increase in number.H 
The natural increase in the numbers of slaves, 
dependent for food, clothing, shelter, and medical 
care, continued to demand cash increases in income to 
provide for these needs. Many farmers were forced 
to move to more productive lands, or to sell "excess" 
slaves, 
Georgia's lands were losing fertility in the older, 
more utilized, areas of the eastern piedmont. The red 
shale and clay soils of the piedmont were more prone 
to erosion and depletion than were alluvial or loamy 
soils in other areas.12 
Nineteen of Georgia's older ;.cotton, counties, 
those in the older or intermediate aged cotton lands, 
11 
Kemble, Journal of a Residence on a Georgia 
Plantation in 1833-1839, ed. John A. Scott7 p. 378. 
12 
Richard Sutch, "The Profitability of Ante 
Bellum Slavery Revisited", in Aitken, Did Slavery Pay?, 
pp. 236-2*11. 
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declined in population from 1850 to i860. Ten of these 
counties had decreases in cotton production per slave 
in the decade, yet all but three had shown increases 
in slaves and slaveownership during the period. In 
I850, seven of the sixteen greatest cotton producing 
counties ( cotton per slave ) were in the older and 
intermediate cotton counties, but by I860 only two 
remained. TABLE FIVE demonstrates that in over 
half of the older and intermediate counties, slaves were 
not producing as much cotton. 
Morgan county was a typical county in the older 
cotton belt. It had declined in population between 1850 
and i860, as well as in numbers of slaves per family,and 
cotton bales per slave. Yet, this was not a new 
occurence in the area, for one resident had commented 
in 1843 that 
Morgan County once sustained double her 
present population, and supported it 
profitably to the occupants of her soil. 
Why is this? Her territorial limits have 
not been contracted. The answer is an 
easy, though very melancoly onej one 
acre of her soil would then produce what 
three will hardly do now. That our 
population is yearly decreasing - many 
of our most valuable citizens are leaving 
us, and are going in search of more 
productive lands.13 
13 
James C. Bonner, "Agricultural Adjustments in 
Ante-Bellura Georgia," in James C. Bonner and Lucien E. 
Roberts,eds,, Studies in Georgia History and Government 
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TABLES FIVE, ,SIX, and SEVEN.indicate that in 
areas losing population it was the small farmers 
and owners of few or no slaves that were moving from 
the counties as cotton planters increased the size 
of their landholdings to increase production and 
profits. 
In the areas gaining population, the situation 
varied. In older cotton counties, small slaveholders 
would seem to have moved and been replaced by non- 
slaveholders, perhaps a reflection of the low prices 
of the worn out lands, or an increase in tenant farmers. 
In the intermediate and newer cotton counties, increases 
appear to have been from small farmers and the holders 
of only a few slaves. 
The areas gaining in population all showed 
increased production of cotton per slave between 1850 
and i860. Only in the intermediate cotton counties 
were the lands more productive in the areas losing 
population, than in the counties gaining new residents. 
Although many farmers did move to newer lands 
in the state to search for greater productivity, and 
many moved to other states, many stayed to open 
lands of secondary quality within their own counties. 
In Georgia, and throughout the south in the 1850's, 
cultivated acres increased, as did the value of the 
cultivated lands. The growth in the value of farms 
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TABLE FIVE 
STATISTICS OF GEORGIA COTTON COUNTIES THAT SHOWED 
POPULATION DECLINES DURING THE PERIOD 1850 - i860. 
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Morgan 12. 4 12.1 1.1 1.6 1.2 57.2 
Wilkes 10.1 12.8 19.0 1.5 1.1 55.0 
Oglethorpe 9.6 9.9 -5.3 1.6 1.2 55.7 
Greene 9.7 10.0 4.9 1.5 1.0 55.1 
Lincoln 10.0 12.1 22.9 1.4 0.9 50.4 
Putnam 12.3 13.1 49.1 1.2 1.6 44.3 
Twiggs 6.6 9.4 167.2 2.1 2.5 54.2 
Taliaferro 7.5 8.2 7.3 1.7 1.1 65.7 
Burke 6.7 11.2 76.6 1.8 2.0 52.6 
Baldwin 7.1 6.4 62.2 1.0 1.4 73.9 
Clarke 5.5 5.6 -1.2 0.8 0.7 62.7 
Columbia 11.0 11.2 41.3 1.4 1.2 52.2 
Jones 8.5 9.5 28.8 1.4 1.6 49.1 
Elbert 5.3 6.3 21.6 1.4 1.0 64.1 
AVERAGE 8.7 9.8 35.4 1.5 1.3 56.4 
INTERMEDIATE 
Houston 8.7 10.1 28.2 2.0 2.7 47.7 
Monroe 9.0 9.6 33.8 1.5 1.7 56.2 
Jasper 8.9 ?•* 7.1 1.4 1.3 55.9 Butts 4.4 4.9 40.0 1.5 1.8 64.4 
Bibb 4.4 3.7 54.8 0.6 0.9 71.8 
AVERAGE 7.1 7.6 32.8 1.4 1.7 59.2 
NEWER  LANDS 
Troupe 7.0 8.4 10.8 1.6 1.8 55.7 
Harris 6.4 7.0 19.2 1.5 1.9 56.2 
Meriwhethe r    5.6 7.3 17.4 1.6 2.1 57.2 
Coweta 3.9 5.4 41.1 1.9 2.1 66.0 
Cobb 1.2 2.1 106.3 1.0 0.9 76.6 
Thomas 6.2 7.5 38.6 1.5 1.1 57.0 
AVERAGE 5.1 6.3 39.0 
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1.5 1.7 61.5 
TABLE SIX 
STATISTICS  OF GEORGIA  COTTON COUNTIES  THAT  SHOWED 
POPULATION  INCREASES  DURING THE PERIOD 18 50-1860^ 
i                                              w W          «<;\o 
>H           >*      fr«             3o 3o     wwco 
vA           *A      o '         <: "^ •oi'o    \Qfr«*-« 
MHO          pqco ,PPCO    H 
<g                        >eio    >e*o    -so     03 0.3    AXV1 
So                               H?«C»     H)XCD   -2KCO          IP .           „MO 
<0                                 MSH     M^H   Hli.H      ^fc\ =«fc\     VS.*.-* 
Older Cotton 
Area # 11 15   4.2  4.3  103.5 1.2 1.9  6-3.6 
Wilkinson     2.8  3.8  109.2 1.8 2.8  66.9 
Hancock      9.3  9.2   64.8 1.6 1.6  45.6 
Madison      2.9  2.5   31.2 l.l 1.0  75.3 
Richmond      5.0  3.2   80.6 0,1 0.3  ?0.0 
Scriven      6.5  6.9  137.2 1.1 1.2  66.7 
Bullock      3.0  3.7  160.8 0.4 0.6  72.0 
Montgomery    2.6  1.2  230.4 0.5 0.3  72.3 
AVERAGE       4.5  4.3  111.7  1.0  1.4  67.6 
Intermediate 
Cotton 
Area # 10l6 2.9 3.7 32.8 1.7 1.8 74.9 
Walton 3.3 3.8 32.1 1.4 1.2 74.3 
Newton 3.8 4.7 55.1 
0.4 
1.2 69.5 
Jackson 2.4 2.5 71.3 0.5 77.4 
Gwinnett 1.4 1.6 16.8 1.1 1.0 78.8 
Upson 5.9 5.3 42.6 1.6 1.9 66.5 
Dooly 2.9 5.5 273.7 2.1 2.5 62.2 







AVERAGE 3.0 1.3 66.4 
14 
Because of county reorganizations between 
1850 and i860, many counties have been grouped into 
areas. Sixteen counties do not fit into grouping 
or geographic areas because of reorganization and 
have been dropped from the analysis. 
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TABLE SIX (Continued) 
New Cotton 
Area # 3*7, 4.8 6.9 146.0 2.2 2.7 62.7 
Area # 5*J 3.5 5.6 153.0 2.4 3.0 64.3 
Area # 61? 4.1 4.4 43.0 1.0 1.4 65.4 
Decatur 4.1 5.6 200.0 1.5 1.4 54.5 
Campbell . 1.6 1.6 46.9 2.1 2.2 75.5 
Carroll 0.8 1.1 99.6 1.1 2.1 86.7 
Heard 3.2 3.4 57.9 1.4 2.3 70.5 
Paulding 1.4 0.5 -7.8 1.0 
1.9 
4.1 90.4 
AVERAGE 3.8 5.5 121.0 2.5 66.2 
15 
Area 11 is composed of Emanuel, Laurens, 
Washington, and Johnson counties. 
16 
Area 10 is composed of Fayette, Henry, 
Pike, Clayton, and Spalding counties. 
17 
Area 3 is composed of Baker, Clay, Calhoun, 
Dougherty, Early, Lee, Miller, Mitchell, Quitnam, 
Terrell, Randolph, and Stewart counties. 
18 
Area 5 is composed of Sumpter and Webster 
counties. 
19 
Area 6 is composed of Muscogee and 
Chattahoochee counties. 
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,  TABLE SEVEN 
A SUMMARY OF THE COTTON COUNTIES WITH POPULATION 
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The Counties Losing Population 
8.7  9.8   35.^ 1.5  1.3 56.4 
7.1  7.6   32.8 1.4  1.7 59.2 
5.1  6.3   39.0 1.5  1.7 61.5 
7.5  8.5 35.7 1.5  1.5  58.2 
The Counties Gaining Population 
Old Cotton 4.5 4.3 111.7 1.0 1.4 
Int.Cotton 3.0 3.6 53.0 1.3 1.4 





3.8  4.7  100.1 1.5  1.9  66.6 
20 
As the cotton areas gaining population were 
generally in newer, undeveloped ares, land values 
would be expected to show a much greater increase 
than in areas previously developed. 
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in the older cotton areas did not compare with the 
rate in the newer cotton areas of the west and south- 
western parts of the state; in fact it fell below 
average land increases. 
Yields of cotton increased approximately 190# 
throughout the south between 1850 and i860. Larger 
farms with many more slaves, better lands, and larger 
markets with good prices all tended to encourage 
more production. The fifties were flush times for 
the cotton planters of Georgia.21 
While the fifties were good years for Georgia 
planters, the preceding decades had not always been 
so fortunate. The depression of 1839-184-4 had been a 
very bad period for planters 1 cotton prices had fallen 
to a low of 5 l/2 cents a pound in the middle l840,s. 
Planters at that time had considered the limitation 
of crops and the diversification of agriculture as 
answers to their economic dilemma. A state convention 
had been held in Milledgeville in 1845 to consider 
statewide crop limitation, but had failed in its goal 
" for a lack of understanding that its purpose would 
21 
Gates, The Farmer's Agej Agriculture 1815- 
I860, p.1461 Conrad and Meyer, "The Economics of 
Slavery in the Antebellum South" in Aitken, Did 
Slavery Pay?, pp. 132-1751 and, Randall and Donald, 
The Civil War and Reconstruction, p.74. 
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be consultive and'advisory only".22 Georgians were 
not willing to be regulated, and failed to believe 
that crop control would stabilize prices. 
Georgia planters at that time felt that they 
could not make a profit when prices fell below ten 
cents a pound.23 if a ten cent minimum is accepted 
as an indicator of a profitable year, then Georgians 
suffered economic losses in 1838, 1840-1846, 1848- 
1849, 1851-1852, and 1854-1855.2/f Whether profits 
were actually poor or not in those years is not 
here in question, but the fact that Georgia's planters 
perceived that nearly one-half of the cotton seasons 
in the last three decades of the ante-bellum period 
were unprofitable. 
Frequent years of cash shortages, and the 
complexities of dealing with foreign manufacturers, 
forced virtually all planters and cotton producers to 
use the services of factors. The system of factorage 
answered the needs of the growers, and became of 
necessity a vital part of the cotton system in the 
lower south. For if 
a Planter's cotton crop ranges at least 
22 
R. Rowell, L. Singleton, and W. Turner in Bonner, 
"Agricultural Adjustment in Ante-Bellum Georgia",p.137. 
23 
Olmsted, The Slave States, ed. Harvey Wish, 
p.248, and Bonner, "The Genesis of Agricultural Reform 
in the Cotton Bolt", p.487. 
24 
Freehling, Prelude to Civil War, p.362. 
72 
"from fair to middling", and if the 
harvest weather is not perfect there will 
be bales of inferior grade. But a factory 
works on orders for definite sorts and 
qualities of cloth.... As a rule, therefore, 
a factory would not buy the miscellaneous 
output of a plantation even if it lay 
within a stones throw of the planter's 
gin. The product of many fields must 
needs be assembled and sorted in dealer's 
hands to await the varied calls of factories    * 
upon the stock.... On rare occasions a 
planter would seek to escape some of the 
middleman's charges by dealing directly 
with a distant purchaser, but this 
envolved such enterprise and risk... 
that the more common practise was not 
only to submit to brokerage, but to 
engage the services and accept the charges 
of a factor in addition.25 
Georgia had factorage houses in Macon, Atlanta, 
Albany, and Savannah, all the major communications 
centers of the state. These men were willing to 
lend planters the funds necessary for the production 
of the following year's crops when the current crop 
had not yielded sufficient cash for the continuation 
of agricultural activities. However, as with all 
financial services, there were demands made upon the 
recipient. The planters were required to assign the 
following yearfe crop to the factor, from which was 
deducted the usual fees for services rendered.2" 
25 
Phillips, Life and Labor in the Old South,p.1^0. 
26 
Phillips, op. cit., p. 154, indicates that the 
cost of brokerage was l/k%  to the seller and l/2f»  to 
the buyer. Olmsted, The Slave States, ed. Harvey Wish, 
commented that factors charged upwards of 15$ for 
services other than brokerage., p. 244 . Cohn, in The 
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Factors were 'often northerners, or had extensive 
connections with northern banking institutions. The 
factors were willing to lend all the necessities of 
plantation lifei salt pork, slave clothing and shoes, 
iron goods, and agricultural implements, all were often 
advanced by factors to planters in "hard times". 
The factorage system enabled planters to continue 
through bad times, and created a system not unlike the 
northern "company store". Yet, many men were unable 
to escape their obligations to their factors, and just 
kept hoping for that "good year" when prices would 
yield such high profits that their obligations to the 
factors would be permanently erased. Few men were 
willing to limit crops, or to switch to alternative 
crops, for they wanted, and needed, to have that good 
year. Most Georgia cotton planters had those good years 
from 1855-1859. 
The cotton planters in Georgia had to face a 
myriad of problems in the 1850*3 1 1) a constant loss 
of production on individual farms in the older areas of 
the state because of exploitive agricultural methodsi 
26 (continuedT 
Life and Tiroes of Kinf; Cotton, p. I22ff. .places 
the average brokerage fee at 2.5>, while adding that 
the factor upped the normal fee for advancement of goods 
and added his 2.5/5 as well. He stated that 
cash advanced with a lien on the next year's crops 
carried interest rates of 8%  to 30#, 
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2) greater competition for markets from newer, high- 
yield lands in southwest Georgia and the newer cotton 
statesi and, 3) a constant dependence on an economic 
system based on factorage that took advantage of 
the constant fluctuations in cotton prices. It was 
a system that had built-in problems. 
It was an economic way of life where weaknesses 
compounded weakness. Gray pointed out its failings 
in his great study of the plantations when he statedt 
because it stressed maximum current 
money income, it was not favorable to 
the accumulation of wealth over a long 
period. This resulted in a failure to 
provide for soil conservation, and a 
disregard for the small economies that 
contribute toward an accumulation of 
wealth. This waste of soil periodically 
necessitated heavy expenses for the purchase 
of new land, and the large profits of 
the "good years" stimulated personal 
extravagance among planters.... The South 
in general ... was continuously in debt because 
it always needed new capital for expansion. 
But the relative poverty of the South, 
as compared with the North, was the result 
of this system of rural economy that 
was wasteful in both production and 
consumption.2? 
In retrospect the system might have been wasteful, 
but to the planters of the day who were making money 
"hand over fist", at least in the late ante-bellum years, 
it was all they knew. " The principal object of all 
2? 
Lewis C. Gray, History of Agriculture in the 
Southern United States to I80O, 2  volsrj (Washington, 
D.C., 1933). P.28; 
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residents of the tfotton belt except those living a 
marginal existence was to produce the greatest 
possible amount of cotton, and land, new land, 
produced more cotton,28 
Perhaps there was a different attitude among the 
planters of the newer lands of southwestern Georgia. 
They had pulled up stakes in their old communities and 
moved to the frontier lands of western Georgia to r'eap 
quick cotton profits on new lands, and were willing to 
move on once their lands ceased yielding those profits. 
It would appear that these men did not put down roots 
in a new location, but were always prepared-for change. 
These men were not psychologically Georgians at all, 
but rather were cotton planters, and their home was 
anywhere that would support cotton agriculture. 
The attitude of the planters in newer areas was 
influential on manyi typical was a letter written 
to a planter in the newer cotton lands of Mississippi 
by a Georgian in the older cotton landsi 
I have never visited your county, 
truly because I have always feared 
I should either move or always wish 
.to do it.2? 
28 
Gates, The Farmers Agei Agriculture 1815-1860, p. 
142. 
29 
David R. Williams to Boiling Hall in Phillips, 
Life and Labor in the Old South, pp.104-105. 
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Obviously the sight of good cotton lands was too great 
to be resisted. 
The inhabitants of the older cotton areas did 
not have the desire, or the energy, to move on to 
newer lands. Typical of the attitudes of many in the 
older counties was a letter which stated that 
the attitudes which most Cobb County men 
wish to pursue was one of tranquility, 
with an opportunity to enjoy the fruits of 
the hard work which they had done and 
were continuing to do. Men who had come 
into the county in 1833 and in about, 
twenty years built homes and industries 
were not liknly to rush impetuously into 
any action,30 
There was a conservatism among many of the planters 
in the older areas, a conservatism based on  their age 
and years involved in their communities. While their 
lands were less productive, they had more slaves, more 
land, and better homes than the newer residents. They 
had worked hard to establish their estates, and they 
were not willing to start again. 
Cotton planters were men tied to a crop that 
demanded movement, and a constant fluctuation in 
cash income. They were men tied to the factorage 
system for the ongoing production of their staple 
crop. Many planters developed an attitude that saw 
30 
Sarah B.C. Temple, The First Hundred Yearsi 
_A_Short History of Cobb CountyT In Georgia (Atlanta, 
1935FT~p. 226.  ""  " ~     — — 
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the production of their crop as more important than 
■ 
their place of residence, but other3 stayed where they 
were, tied by years of hard labor and effort, unable 
to accept change. Cotton planters all, but strongly 




THB POLITICS OF SLAVERY 
The final ante-bellum decade in Georgia began 
with the chaos and political realignments leading to 
the Compromise of 1850, and ended with the presidential 
election of I860. The intervening years were filled 
with the emotional issues of the territorial expansion 
of slavery, the fugitive-slave laws, and the endless 
agitation of the abolitionists. The subjects were 
never far from public consideration in Georgia, and 
each year and each new election demanded their open 
discussion. 
The creation of the Southern Rights Party in 
Georgia in 1850 gave outspoken citizens an outlet 
for their sentiments. The party merged with the 
National- Democracy several years after its formation, 
but its power within the parent organization was to 
grow throughout the decade. Each issue and each new 
election saw the need to restate and redefine the 
basic tenets of the state's right position. 
The Whig Party of Georgia became the core of 
the Unionist Party of Georgia in 1850, Formed during 
the Georgia Platform controversy, changing political 
needs caused the Party to pass through Know-Nothing, 
American, and Constitutional Party phases. The several 
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transformations of the Party caused the gradual change 
of leadership and shifted the political position of 
the organization from one with positive goals to 
one concerned only with defeat of the Democratic 
opposition and the preservation of the Union. 
The decade of the 1850's was a period of 
perceived seige for many Georgians. Their power in 
the political arena, their physical existence;, and 
their psychological states were under constant „ 
attacks from without and from within their own home 
territory. Georgians were often exposed to the 
anti-slavery propaganda of"the northern anti- 
slave societies, and from the tracts of the Republican 
presses in the later years of the period. They and 
their institutions were assaulted in speeches in the 
halls of Congress, and their institutions were 
discussed in the literature produced by their own 
southern press. 
Constant reflection on  their institutions! both 
internally and externally, caused Georgians to examine 
their society and to create and construct a 
world view of their society for themselves. When this 
construction had been completed, and the majority of 
voters in the state were convinced that they were no 
longer on common ground with the north, secession 
was inevitable. 
80 
Politics played a crucial role in Georgia's 
awakening self-awareness, but that awareness was more 
vitally altered by the. attempts of southern 
intellectuals to define and describe their society 
and its institutions. It was the southerners' response 
to abolition literature that provided them with a 
psychological structure of values upon which to base 
their actions. Above all other things, the actions of 
the majority of southerners were based on their thoughts 




THE HEART OF GEORGIAN SOCIETYt   SLAVERY 
While southerners were fond of considering 
themselves an agrarian society, opposed to all 
"demeaning" capitalistic ventures, technology was 
rearing its ugly head among the magnolias. Georgia, 
the Empire State of the South, was proud of her 
rapid advances in textile manufacturing, and was 
trying to increase the diversity of manufactured 
goods in the state. A dichotomy existed; for while 
many Georgians condemmed the north for its vulgar 
capitalistic system, others were attempting to 
incorporate its technology into their slave-based 
agricultural system. Yet, there was no question 
that slavery was at the heart of Georgia's economy. 
The early years of the nineteenth century 
had seen frequent Jeffersonian debates on the morality 
of the slave system. Many southern churches had 
initially considered the institution wrong because 
it denied religion and salvation to the slaves, thus 
encouraging sin and sinners. As late as 1833i the 
Presbyterian Synods of South Carolina and Georgia 
still regretted that religious training could not 
be given to slaves because 
82 
in the preserft state of feelings in the 
South, a ministry of their own could 
neither be obtained NOR TOLERATED.1 
A sense of guilt followed those southern evangelists 
who saw their calling as the spreading of the Gospel. 
Although Methodist and Baptist churches split as 
national bodies in 18*4-5 over the qustion of slavery, 
the Presbyterian church continued as a national body 
until 1861. Historians of the Church point to the 
fact that they allowed black membership in the south2, 
however, that membership was equal to but 2.8$ of 
free blacks or 0.35$ of all southern slaves. In reality, 
few blacks received formal religion after 1845. 
Southern society gradually came to view any 
liberal outlook on slavery as dangerous to the society. 
As the institution became firmly established, Georgia 
tried to regulate it. The state passed laws in 
1829 which required the death penalty for all those 
publishing or distributing "incendiary literature" 
advocating abolition or slave insurrection. No 
longer was the question of the morality of slavery 
to be discussed openly. 
1 
Goodell, American Slave Codes in Stantley M. 
Elkins, SlaveryTNew York, 1963), p.6l 
2 
Walter L. Lingle , Presbyteriansi  Their History 
and Beliefs (Richmond, 19^4), p.104. 
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The passage, of laws was not enough, however, to 
prevent Georgians from discussing and questioning 
their institution in private. Many saw its continuance 
as an unfortunate necessity! and, there can be 
little question that to those southerners who placed 
the institutions of marriage and the "Christian 
family" above all others, slavery presented serious 
problems. 
Many slaveholders, particularly those with 
small numbers of slaves, considered their slaves as 
part of the plantation family, and felt that as 
family- members they should adhere to the values of 
that family. Yet marriage, " the most sacred of 
institutions", was not legally required by or for 
the slaves. Thomas R. R, Cobb of Georgia, the brother 
of political leader Howell Cobb, sadly admitted in 
1858 that 
the contract of marriage not being 
recognized among slaves, none of its 
consequences follow,3 
Those consequences were the establishment of 
stable family lives and relative conditions of 
monogamy. 
There is little doubt that the "immorality" 
of the bondsmen in their interpersonal relationships 
3        ~~^ 
Thomas R. R. Cobb, quoted in Elkins, Slavery, 
p. 56. 
8^ 
was an extremely eihbarassing issue to many white 
southerners. Mary Ghesnut commented upon the subject 
in her Diaryi 
note the glaring inconsistencies of life. 
Our Chaterlaine locked up Eugene Sue, and 
returned even Washington Allston's 
novel with thanks and a decided hint that 
it should be burned.... Bad books are 
not allowed house room..., but bad 
women, if they are not white and serve 
in a menial capacity, may swarm the 
house unmolested.... If you show by 
a chance remark that you see fthat] some 
particular creature more shameless 
than the rest has no end of children and 
no beginning of husband, you are frowned 
upon. You are talking on improper 
subjects.^" 
The issue was no doubt "improper" in a society 
so fond of listing its moral accomplishments, and 
so endeared of family life that women were placed 
"upon a pedestal", high above the world's evil, at 
least in men's minds. 
The publication of Harriet Beecher Stowe's 
Uncle Tom's Cabin thrust deeply into the hearts of 
slaveholders troubled about the morality of slavery. 
While few were concerned with the "exaggerated tales" 
of brutality, the issue of slave immorality did 
require defense. Mary Chesnut , like many southerners, 
was offended by the book. 
^  
Chesnut, A Diary from Dixie, pp.44-45. 
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Read Uncle Tcyn'a Cabin again. These 
Negro women have a chance here that 
women have nowhere else. They can redeem 
themselves - The "impropers" can.... It 
is not a nice topic, but Mrs. Stowe 
revels in it. How delightfully Pharisaic 
a feeling it must be to rise superior, and 
fancy we are so degraded as to defend and 
'like to live with such degraded creatures 
around us - such men as Lagree and his 
women.... As far as I can see, Southern 
women do all that missionaries could do 
to prevent and alleviate evils.... Evas 
are mostly in the heaven of Mrs. Stowe's 
imagination.5 
The immorality of the slaves, and the general 
morality of the institution were sore points to 
many southerners. However, a philosophy began to 
solidify in the south as increased pressure from 
the abolitionists called the issue to question with 
increasing frequency in the last two ante-bellum 
decades. The view saw the slaveholder as the benefactor 
of the slave, and a spiritual beacon for a lost race. 
William A Smith, President of Randolph-Macon College, 
wrote in the introduction to his book, Lectures on 
the Philosophy and Practice of Slavery, such a 
justification of slavery. 
There are not a few.,. spread through our 
Southern States... whose minds are in a 
state of great embarrassment on this 
subject.... The incompatability of the 
"fixed facts" and the "persisting ideal" 
has set men against themselves. Pressed 
5 
Chesnut, A Diary from Dixie, pp.199-200. 
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on the one hand by what is assumed to 
be a correct "principle, and on the other 
by... the necessity of governing and 
providing for their slaves... they find 
themselves in a most embarrassing situation, 
from which they sigh to be relieved,6 
The author, having described the situation, defined 
slavery as a "positive good" for the slaves, if not 
a burden for the slaveholders. A view rarely 
advanced in preceding decades, this viewpoint came 
into ' increased use in the 1850's. 
George Fitzhugh used the "positive good" thesis 
more than any other southern writer of the period. 
Widely read, his Sociology for the South assaulted 
the northern system of capitalism as a brutal force 
which enslaved the poor white and chained him to 
industry.. 
The author equated the north with modern 
industry, and industry with modern civilization. 
He saw the south as the culmination of the finest 
elements of the classical tradition of civilization. 
But far the worst feature of modern 
civilization, which is the civilization 
of free society, remains to be exposed. 
V/hilst labor saving devices have probably 
reduced by one half... the amount of work 
needed for comfortable support, the free 
laborer is compelled by capital and 
competition to work more than he ever did 
6        
in Ralph E. Morrow, "Was the Proslavery Argument 
for Home Consumption", quoted in The, Age of Civil 
War and Reconstruction, ed. Charles Crowe, p,102, 
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before, and is less comfortable. The 
organization ,of society cheats him of 
his earnings.'.,. We need never have 
white slaves in the South, because we 
have black ones.... We have introduced 
the subject of negro slavery to afford 
us a better opportunity to disclaim the 
purpose of reducing the white man any 
where to the condition of the negro 
slaves here.,.. The Southerner is the 
negro's friend, his only friend.7 
Fitzhugh's subtle argument served two functionsi 
it portrayed the slaveholder as a beneficent caretaker 
of the slave - "his only friend", and it provided 
a more needed play for the sympathies and support 
of the non-slaveholding whites in the south. In 
its emphasis on the "failures" of the capitalistic 
system, it reminded the poor whites of slave states 
that they were not enslaved to menial labor only 
because blacks served that function. It gave all 
whites reason for racial and social superiority. 
That these arguments were useful to politicians 
of the period can clearly be seen in the speeches 
of the Governors of South Carolina and Georgia. 
Governor Hammond of South Carolina stated in his 
article " Slavery in the Light of Political Science" 
that 
our patriarchal system of domestic servitude 
i"  
7 
Fitzhugh, Sociology for the South, or, the 
Failure of Free Society (Richmond, Ya., lSlfr). 
PP. 9^-95. 
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is... well calculated to awaken the higher 
and finer feelings of our nature.... In this 
cold, calculating, ambitious world of 
ours, there are few ties more heartfelt, 
or of more benignant influence, than 
those which mutually bind master and » 
slave, under our ancient system, handed 
down from the father of Israel.° 
The doubts of the slaveowner were salved by the 
knowledge.that God and Moses were on his side. 
Joseph E, Brown, Governor of Georgia, appealed 
to the more basic nature of the non-slaveholding 
whites when he borrowed Fitzhiigh's belief that the 
poor whites would be made servants with liberation 
of the slaves. Brown frequently reminded the non- 
slaveholders of the abolitionists'plans and "he 
sought to frighten them into secession by declaring 
that if the slaves should be freed, the United States 
government would be forced to raise more than two 
billion dollars by taxation with which to pay for 
them, and that the former slaveholders would 
receive the money and with it buy up all the land 
and make tenants of the small farmers".9 
Fitzhugh's arguments were used to unite the 
8         
quoted in Elliott, Cotton is King and Other 
Pro-Slavery Arguments, pp.6^9-650. 
.9 
quoted in T. Conn Bryan, Confederate Georgia 
(Athens, Ga., 1953). p.10. 
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southern slaveholders, and many non-slaveholders, 
around a common social system. Sociology for the 
South was just the written representation of the 
movement that was growing in Georgia during the 
final ante-bellum decade. From an earlier era where 
doubts of the slave system were openly expressed, 
the attacks from without had moved Georgia to a 
stance that justified slavery on moral and racial 
grounds to much of the populace. Slavery "was needed" 
to protect the blacks from their own failings as 




THE FEAR OF SLAVE REVOLT 
As the final decade before the Civil War 
progressed, and Georgians grew in self-realization 
as slaveholders and white southerners, they 
successfully coped with the Compromise of 1850 and 
the Kansas-Nebraska Act. While Fitzhugh and his 
intellectual school of thought helped slaveholder 
and non-slaveholder alike in their attempts to 
justify the "peculiar institution", the gentle 
descriptions of idealistic relationships between 
slave and slaveholder were unable to calm the gut 
fear of most slaveholders, the fear of slave revolt. 
The political chaos of the fifties was tolerable 
within a stable society, but when that society saw 
that external forces were leading to internal conflict, 
movements that threatened to become destructive 
of that society, then the offending elements had to be 
removed from positions of authority. Northern 
abolitionists urged slaves to revolt against their 
masters in the south, and these calls to insurrection 
were viewed with far more gravity than was the 
political maneuvering on the Congressional stage. 
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Hammond's I858 speech extolling the bliss of 
■f 
slave society clearly showed the dualistic nature of 
his philosophy. Shortly after praising the "heartfelt 
bond" between master and slave, Hammond refused many 
abolitionist's requests that slaves be taught to 
read 1 
allow our slaves to read your writings, 
stimulating them to cut our throats? 
Can yon believe us to be such unspeakable 
fools? 
He continued 1 
I do not mean by all this to say that 
we are in a state of actual alarm and 
fear of our slaves; but under existing 
circumstances we should be ineffably 
stupid not to increase our vigilance, 
and strengthen our hands.1 
As slaveholders learned to justify their positions 
of ownership as a kindness to the black race, they 
learned to rationalize that slaves were childlike 
creatures., and as child could be prone to violence 
due to a lack of sophistication and an inability to 
fully appreciate all that the slaveholders were doing 
for them. The slaveholders had the responsibility, 
therefore, to protect his slaves from their own 
foolishness, much in the way a parent protects a child, 
1 ~' 
Hammond, "Slavery in the Light of Political 
"Science" in Elliott, Cotton is King and Other Pro- 
Slavery Arguments, pp.6^9-650 7 
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The fear of insurrection had long plagued the 
planters of Georgia. Early in the century the mutiny 
of the Santa Domingo slaves established a precedent 
that slaveholders envisioned was possible on every 
plantation in the south. When the inflamatory tracts 
of David Walker, an educated northern black, were 
discovered in Georgia in 1829,and upon examination 
seen to advocate bloody revenge upon all whites, the 
legislature was pressured into prompt response. Stiff 
regulations were passed, strengthening the slave 
codes and mandating the death penalty for a convicted 
distributer of "inflamatory literature". 
Time passed, and slave rebellions waned. Slave 
codes were relaxed, and often ignored totally. The 
neighborhood night patrols vanished in many parts of 
Georgia. 
However, just as many memories of Santa Domingo 
were fading, Nat Turner received his call from God 
and conducted his famous raid. The uprising of slaves 
in Southhampton, Virginia, resulted in the deaths of 
13 men, 18 women, and 2k  children, and contributed 
far more to suppression of slaves in Georgia than 
any other single event of the era. 
After Turner's raid plots were seen everywhere, 
and every slave was seen as a potential adversary. Free 
93 
blacks were particularly distrusted, and their rights 
were continually narrowed in the last decades before 
the War, Teachers, often northerners, were seen as 
abolitionists in disguise, and the discovery of a 
plotted revolt involving a teacher in Georgia in 
18^1 only tended to increase the distrust of outsiders. 
While the fear continually haunted the psyche 
of many slaveholders, the press frequently, and very 
emotionally, brought the issue to the surfaces 
the slaves are in the state of insurrection 
all over the country. Every paper brings 
us accounts of their plots for a general 
uprising,2 
Thus,it was with a constant, subconscious fear that 
many Georgians lived, and the news of events at Hamper's 
Ferry justified those fears. 
John Brown, a somewhat unstable abolitionist, 
had taken the Federal Arsenal at Harper's Ferry, 
Virginia, and with forty hostages called for a 
general slave revolt. It did not matter that Brown's 
efforts were futile, and that no slaves joined the 
abortive cause. The shock of this physical attack 
clearly identified his actions with those of the 
northern abolitionists. His brave, if foolhardy, 
action had linked the most vulnerable facet of 
2       : 
Nicholas Halasz, The Rattling Chains (New York, 
1966), p.22**. g4 
the slave system tfl  the Republican Party of the 
north and created general fear and panic throughout 
the south. Many saw Brown's actions as indicators 
of the future under a Republican administration.3 
Governor Brown of Georgia spoke at his second 
inauguration shortly after Harper's Ferry* and it 
was clearly evident from his speech that he wanted 
to make sure that Georgians would no longer allow 
themselves to be threatened by the results of 
northern agitation against slavery. In clear reference 
to the recent raid, Brown stated that 
our fathers consented to enter the 
confederacy of these states only upon 
terms of perfect equality} and we as their 
sons, would be unworthy of our sires, 
if we consented to remain in the 
confederacy a day longer than this 
3 
That Brown's act and the Republican Party 
were linked is supported byj Ghesnut, A Diary from 
Dixie, p.l; George M. Fredrickson, The Inner Civil 
War, Northern Intellectuals and the Crisis of the Union 
(New York, 1965JT~p.~^3i Roy Franklin Nichols, The 
Disruption of American Democracy (New York, 19^$T, 
pp.267-265"; Craven, The G_rqwth of Southern Nationalism, 
1848-1861, pp.306-311j Randall and Donald, The cTvTl 
War And Reconstruction, pp.125-126} Charles Grier 
Sellers Jr., "The Tragic Southerner", pp.97-98, William 
R. Taylor, "The Synthetic Southern Gentleman", pp.110- 
111, and Louis Ruchames. "John Brown and the 
American Tradition", pp.209-210, all in Crowe, ed..,The 
A^e of Civil War and Reconstruction. 
It has been suggested by many authors that the 
south did not initially associate Brown with the 
Republican Party, but that the subsequent praise of 
his act by the Party and by abolitionists led to 
the association of the two. This was probably the 
case. _ 
principle of equality is recognized. 
Prompted by ambitious leaders... a 
majority of t'he northern states have 
formed themselves into a great sectional, 
political party which virtually denies 
our equality in the Union.... I love the 
union... as long as it does not violate 
the rights of my native South. But 
should the two come into conflict,.I 
love the rights of the South more,^ 
Joe Brown would carry this view into the contest 
for the presidency in i860, and his views on the 
great northern "sectional party" would influence 
many of his followers. 
Northern political attacks had caused hostilities 
among the sections, but political speeches were 
incapable of stirring the fear experienced after 
Brown's raid. Intellectuals could discuss attacks on 
institutions and societies, but the slaveholders 
perceived threats to their physical and economic 
selves. With the help of an agitated press, many 
southerners came to visualize John Brown and the 
Republicans as the ultimate threat to their well- 
being. Pear of slave revolt instigated by northern 
abolitionists had accomplished more for Georgia's 
secessionist cause than a decade of political diatribes 
by southern leaders. 
quoted in I.W. Avery, The History of the State of 
Georgia, from 1850-1881 (New"YorirrT88lO7~p7??. '.  
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III. 
THE END OF THE DECADE 
For Georgians, the last decade of the ante-bellum 
years was one that began in compromise and ended in 
adamance. The Georgia Platform of I850, developed 
by both Southern Rightists and Unionists, accepted 
the Compromise of 1850, but demanded that abolition 
supporters be removed from high office, that new 
fugitive slave laws be vigorously enforced, slavery 
be left alone in the District of Columbia, slave 
trade not be interfered with, and that slavery be 
allowed in New Mexico. Georgia's two main political 
parties had been able to compromise on a firm 
statement of the minimal requirements expected from 
the nation. 
The decade after the Platform failed to 
demonstrate northern adherence to the minimal demands 
of Georgians 1 northern personal liberty laws, 
abolitionist insults, and ultimately John Brown's 
raid demonstrated the consistent failure, in the 
eyes of most southerners, of the north to live up 
to its end of the bargain. Every event not criticized 
1 
Horace Montgomery, Cracker Parties (Baton 
Rouge, 1950), p.33. 
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by the north was seen as an event supported by 
the north. 
It was a decade that developed a final southern 
consciousness for many Georgians. By no means were 
all Georgians united on  a solution for their common 
problems, however.most were determined to refuse the 
Republicans the triumph of presidential victory. 
The Republicans were perceived as the cause of the 
failure of the Georgia Platform, and a Republican 
victory was seen as an indicator of the fall of 
the southern empire, and a destruction of the way 
of life in the Empire State of the south. 
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IV. 
THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF I860 
The election of i860 represented the final 
clearly defined test of unionist sentiment in Georgia, 
It was a test of popular support for secession before 
the emotionalism of Lincoln's election made its 
opposition difficult. It was a contest that was 
to be fought through traditional party factions, 
realigned under new names, yet familiar to the 
citizens because of the traditional political leaders. 
The moderate and states' rights factions of the 
National Democratic Party separated with the collapse 
of the parent party at Charleston in April of i860,. 
Long at war with each other within the state party 
organization, both factions sent delegates to the 
Charleston convention. Twenty-six of Georgia's 
thirty-six bolted the meeting when it became obvious 
that Stephen Douglas was to receive the nomination. 
The bolters became the core of the Georgia Yanceyites 
that were to help nominate John C. Breckenridge of 
Kentucky as the candidate of the Southern Rights 
Democratic Party formed at Richmond on June 11,1860. 
The more moderate Georgia delegation returned 
from Charleston and later went to Baltimore to 
complete the task of the disrupted convention. 
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They united to support Stephen Douglas for President 
and ex-Governor Hershel V. Johnson of Georgia for 
Vice-President of the Northern Democratic Party- 
ticket. 
Georgia's original Whig supporters, represented 
in the 1850's by the Union, Know-Nothing, and Union 
Constitutional parties, sent delegates to the 
Constitutional Union convention in Baltimore, and 
agreed to support John Bell and Edward Everett as their 
standard bearers. 
The stage had been set for Georgia's final 
ante-bellum presidential contest. According to one 
of the state's leading historians, the triangular 
race between Bell, Breckenridge, and Douglas "resolved 
itself into a repetition of the old arguments, the 
tedious queries, the trite explanations, and the 
conventional expressions of sanguine hopes and gloomy 
forebodings,"* 
While the rhetoric was like that expressed over 
the preceding decade, the presence of an exclusively 
southern party gave definition and urgency to the 
political verbiage. No longer were factions strictly 
aligned by party affiliation; secession and cooperation 
1 
Montgomery, Cracker Parties, p.241. 
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with the Union were issues that were stronger than 
previous party support for many Georgians. 
The inability of the Georgia state*s rights 
advocates to support the Douglas candidacy stemmed 
from the Lincoln-Douglas debates at Preeport, Illinois 
in 1858. At those debates Douglas had stated that 
a territory could exclude slavery, in spite of the 
Dred Scott decision, by refusing to enact local 
"police regulations" necessary to protect and sustain 
the institution. Douglas stated in the final debate 
at Alton, Illinois that "no institution, no law, no 
constitution, should be forced on an unwilling people 
contrary to their wishes,... I will never violate 
or abandon that doctrine if I had to stand alone"2. 
Because of his views on "popular sovereignty", often 
derogatorily called "squatter sovereignty" Douglas was 
left to stand alone without his main southern 
Democratic supporters. 
While Douglas* speech was sensible and logical, 
and based on the time-honored American principle 
of freedom of choice, it cut his political throat 
in the south. Many southerners were not about to 
give an inch on the victory they had received in 
2 
Douglas quoted in Marvin Meyers, Alexander 
Kern, and John G. Cawelti, Sources of the American 
Republic, vol. one, (Chicago, 19o"5"),pp. 395-398^ 
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the Dred Scott decision. 
The Georgia press was quick in its attack of 
Douglas, at least that section of the press controlled 
by the political opposition. The Athens Southern 
Watchman commented that Douglas was "ten thousand 
times more dangerous" than John Brown,3 The press 
of the Constitutional Union Party was elated in 
repeating a Wisconsin editor's belief that "Judge 
Douglas has only one step more to find himself a 
Republican."^ The opinion was openly expressed in the 
Georgia Legislature when W. H. Stiles, a future 
Southern Rights Democrat, stated that " Douglas was 
more dangerous than the Republicans because he was 
operating in the guise of Democracy, supposedly 
friendly to the South. ".5 Little love was shared 
between Douglas and state's rights Democrats or 
Constitutional Union advocatesj both groups felt him 
to be a traitor to southern principles. 
The Douglas supporters depended upon their Vice- 
Presidential candidate to define the merits of his 
3 
quoted in Montgomery, Cracker Parties, p.236. 
quoted in Montgomery, Cracker Parties, p.236. 
5 
quoted in Montgomery, Cracker Parties, p.237. 
See also Craven, The Growth of Southern Nationalism, 
18^8-1861, pp. 3l6T"329:330, and Randall and Donald, 
The" Civil War and Reconstruction, pp. 117-120 and 
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running mate. An eminent Georgian, the party hoped 
his influence would yield a Northern Democratic 
victory in the Empire State. However, the candidate 
was to cause problems in Georgia for as Douglas* 
unionist feelings were well known, Johnson's position 
was far less definitive. Known as a "fire-eater" at 
the dawn of the state's final decade, Johnson had 
then strongly resisted the Compromise of 1850. The 
Constitutional Union forces in 1851 had accused the 
"Coon Killer" of having placed his "seceders aboard 
the Georgia Platform... for the purpose of concealing 
beneath the Platform the fraud of Southern Rights."" 
Many fellow Georgians still considered Johnson to 
be a secessionist. 
Johnson was probably not in favor of secession 
in i860. Perhaps his long-standing southern rights 
"secessionist" stand had been prompted by the obvious 
fact that Georgia, in 1850, was not ready for disunion, 
and thus radical speeches, while gaining attention 
and votes, presented little threat to the nation. 
Whatever his earlier motivations, the candidate in 
1859 appeared to hope that Douglas could restore the 
6  
Montgomery, Cracker Parties, p.46. 
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balance of power within the Union through the National 
Democratic Party victory, and the subsequent failure 
of Republicanism. 
Aware of Douglas' lack of popularity, Johnson 
and Douglas campaigned on the belief that Douglas 
offered the only real possibility of defeating the 
Republican candidate. They saw the creation of the 
sectional southern party as a fatal mistake, splitting 
southern forces to allow an ultimate abolitionist 
triumph. 
Alexander Stephens, the only major political 
figure in Georgia to support the ticket of Douglas 
and Johnson, attempted to interject logic into a 
campaign filled with emotion when he statedi 
I do not anticipate that Mr. Lincoln 
will jeopard our safety or security. He 
can do nothing unless backed by power 
in Congress.7 
While most Georgians were probably aware that Lincoln, 
even if elected, would not carry the Senate along 
with him, yet,logic and emotion did not mix in that 
election campaign. 
The attempts at rationality were not in keeping 
with the spirit of the times. Although the slogan 
of National Democracy was "Thank God No Disunionist 
Sustains Stephen A. Douglas and Kershel V. Johnsont"" 
7 
Louis Pendleton, Alexander H._ Stephens 
(Philadelphia, 1907), pp. 15^59. 
8 
Dumond, The Secession t.lovement, 1860-1861, pill. 
10lf 
the campaigners, through Johnson, came to slowly 
acknowledge the "right" of secession if the state 
were caused to do so by flagrant actions of a 
victorious Republican Party. Johnson maintained 
that 
if the doctrine of non-intervention must 
at last be repudiated} if the National 
Democratic Party cannot be preservedi if 
the South shall persist in the policy which 
she has inaugurated... until the country 
shall be forced into two great antagonistic 
sectional organizations, based on sectional 
issues and bounded by sectional lines, I 
shall recreant to the instincts of my heart 
if I do not link my destiny with hers, 
and follow her fortunes for weal or woe.9 
The emotional attacks of the secessionist press had 
forced Johnson to admit that he too would support 
secession if that were the course taken by Georgia. 
It was a great victory for the secessionists. 
While the Douglas Democrats ran a campaign based 
on the past, the Constitutional Union Party based 
their campaign on  their time-proven method of basic 
negativism. They attacked the opposition, but gave 
no positive campaign statements of their own. They 
attacked the two opposition parties, and hoped to 
keep them on the defensive, too busy to mount an 
opposition. 
Dummond, The Secession Movementi 1860-1861t 
p. 103. -■■":• ~' 
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The Baltimore Convention which nominated Bell 
also had adopted a platform for the Party which 
recognized no other values than "the enforcement 
of the laws" and stated that as 
•the representatives of the Constitutional 
Union men of the country in National 
Convention assembled, we do pledge ourselves 
to maintain, protect, and defend, separately 
and unitedly, those great principles 
of the public liberty, and national safety 
against all enemies, at home and abroad, 
believing that thereby peace may be once 
more restored to the country, and the 
just rights of the people and the State's 
reestablished.iO 
It was a platform few could contradict, and as such 
gave the Party little more than faith in the candidates 
to base a campaign upon. 
While making overtures to state's rights men in 
their illusions to the "laws" and the "Constitution," 
the Bell supporters attempted to convince the voters 
that the supporters of Breckenridge were advocates 
of secession. In a statement both moderate and 
logical, the Bell press emphasized that "although 
Lincoln might be elected, the Supreme Court and 
Congress would be against him and ... the States of 
the South should await some positive overt act before 
resorting to resistance."11 
10 
Dumond, The Secession Movement! 1860-1861,p.93. 
n -. 
Dumond, The Secession Movement! 1860-1861,p.95» 
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While the Constitutional Unionists were willing 
to align themselves with the Douglas camp to attack 
the Breckenridge forces, they were equally happy to 
stab the Douglas supporters with their other handi 
the trouble is that Bell and Breckenridge 
men hold that, subject to the Constitution, 
the territories have no lawful authority; 
*° exclude slavery nor slaveholders, while 
Douglas and his Northern supporters hold 
that the territories have such lav/ful 
authority.... To the doctrine of Judge 
Douglas we, of the Bell party, and the 
Breckenridge party, can never, and will 
never, assent. 2 
The Bell faction was willing to play both opposition 
parties against each other, and did so on every 
possible occasion. The Bell group called the forces 
of Breckenridge extremists, and the Douglas men 
moderates, though they were wrong on the issue of 
popular sovereignity where Breckenridge was correct. 
It was a clever campaign that made both other parties 
incorrect on some issues. 
The Constitutional Union press attacked 
the Vice-Presidential candidate of the Northern 
Democratic Party, indicating that he was aware that 
a Douglas loss would lead to secession. They also 
circulated a letter from the Charleston Mercury 
as proof of the secessionist desires of some of 
12        ~ 
The Augusta, Ga., Daily Chronicle and Sentinel 
in Dumond, The Secession Movementt   1560-1861, p.957 
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the Breckenridge supporters 
and how can the South be saved from 
injury if the Republican Party succeeds 
in the coming Presidential Election? I 
answer, only by dissolving the government 
immediately. If this Party succeeds, loyalty 
to the Union will be treason to the 
South.!3 
The Constitutional Union press felt that this 
type of talk was treason in itself, and only those 
seeking to destroy the Union would support it. Yet, as 
did the Douglas camp earlier, the Union Party leaders 
were eventually forced to deny the act, but support 
the "right" of secession. Ben Hill, Georgia's chief 
Bell supporter, stated at Macon on June 30, i860 
that 
if the experiment is forced, the fact will 
turn out to be, in my humble judgment, that 
this government and Black Republicanism 
cannot live together.... At no period of 
the world's history have four thousand 
millions of property debated whether it 
ought to submit to the rule of the enemy.lZ* 
The Bell and Douglas factions in Georgia both 
were able to unite against the Breckenridge forces' 
secessionist position. While both came to acknowledge 
the "right" of secession, both attempted to provide 
an alternative to the act. 
Both parties saw themselves as the way to defeat 
13 
Letter of Lawrence M. Keitt in the Charleston 
Mercury in Dumond, The Secession Movement, I860- 1861. 
p.105. 
14 
Dumond, The Secession Movement! 1860-1861..p.95t 
(Breckenridge and Lane Campaign Document # 16) 
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the Republicans, and neither saw a Republican victory, 
in and of itself, as sufficient cause for secession. 
Their campaigns were based on "faith" more than on 
logic or realism, faith that they could win and that 
things would improve, and they were basically anti- 
secession campaigns.*5' 
The voice of Southern Democracy in Georgia was 
a strong one. Long before the presidential election 
of i860, its leaders had been preparing for secession. 
The voices of Brown, Toombs, and the Cobbs left 
little questions as to where the party platform stood. 
While their candidate stated that "the Constitution 
and the equality of the states... are the symbols 
of everlasting Union,"^^ the Southern Democratic 
leaders in Georgia gave a far less moderate impression. 
The opposition parties stated that Lincoln's 
election was not an adequate cause for secession, 
and demanded active, overt events to justify that 
15 ' 
See 1 Eaton, 'rne lirowtn of Southern Civilization, 
p.32*1-1 Randall and Donald, The Civil War and Recon- 
struction, pp. 131 -13i+ J Nichols, The Disruption of 
A?nerica"n"""Democracy, pp.-367-368j Bryan, Confederate 
Georgia, pp. l-3i George Gillman Smith, The Story 
of Georgia (Baltimore, 1968), pp. ^78-431, Arthur C. 
Cole, The Whig. Party in the South (Washington, 1913). 
PP. 338^3^1 j Temple, The ""First Hundred Year?;,pp.232-233. 
16 
Randall and Donald, The Civil War and 
Reconstruction, p.132. 
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course of action. Southern Democratic leadership, 
however, felt that Lincoln's election in itself 
constituted an overt event, and thus was cause for 
secession. Thomas R. R. Gobb wrote his mother in 
October of i860 
I can see not earthly hope of defeating 
in November, and their success then, 
whether we will it or not, is inevitable 
disunion. And calmly and coolly..'.   Fs it 
not best? These people hate us, annoy us, 
and would have us assassinated by our 
slaves if they dared..,. Separation is 
desirable, peacefully if we can, forcibly 
if we must.*? 
Governor Brown, head of Georgia's Southern 
Democracy, had made his willingness to secede evident 
in his second inaugural address, yet the Governor 
made his intent clearer days later when he stated that 
if it is ascertained that Black Republicans 
have triumphed over us, I recommend the 
call of a Convention of the people of 
the State at an early time.... For the purpose 
of putting this State in a defensive position 
as fast as possible, and for preparing 
for an emergency which must sooner or 
later be met, I recommend that the sum 
of one  millions of dollars be immediately 
appropriated as a military fund..,, 
"Millions for defense, but not a cent for 
tribute" should be the future motto of 
the Southern States.18 
Brown had little patience for waiting to see what the 
elected Republicans would do in office, 
Thomas R. R. Cobb to Mrs.Cobb in Randall and 
Donald, The Civil War and Reconstruction, p.132. 
Quoted in Fielder, The Life and Times and 
Speeches of Joseph E. Brown (Springfield, 1883)',* p,l68. 
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Howell Cobb, 'at first reluctant to jeopardize 
his national position as Buchanan's Secretary of the 
Treasury, eventually stated that "the hour of 
Georgia's dishonor in the Union, should be the hour 
of her independence out of the Union" ^. With many 
other state leaders, Cobb came to believe that 
Lincoln's election was a slur against the intent of 
the Georgia Platform, and thus a "dishonor" to, the 
state. 
Georgia's Southern Democratic leaders were not 
alone in their support of secession. Every Governor 
but one, and virtually every Senator and Congressman 
from the seven states of the lower south was on record 
as favoring secession in the event of Republican 
victory.2° The Southern Democratic leaders considered 
Lincoln's election to be the final event in the long 
failure of democracy to work in favor of the southern 
cause. 
Georgia's electorate gave a plurality to the 
Breckenridge cause (k8.Sfo)   in the November election, 
but the Douglas and Bell forces polled more votes than 
19 " 
Avery, The History of the State of Georgia, 
p. 129. 
20 
Dumond, The Secession Movementi 1860-1861,p.99. 
110 
the victor. It was basically a conservative, anti- 
secession statement by the populace. As Douglas had 
stated in'his campaign, 
I do not believe that every Breckenridge 
man is a disunionist..., but I do believe 
that every disunionist is a Breckenridge 
man.21 
The disunionits, as of November i860, still did 
not represent the majority of Georgians. 
Lincoln was elected and shortly thereafter 
the Governor's call for a state convention was heeded. 
Statewide elections were heldj delegates went to 
Milledgeville, and Georgia seceded from the Union. 
In the period of a decade, the crisis of the 
union had resolved itself in Georgia's secession. The 
election of i860, and the subsequent delegate elections 
for Milledgeville, can offer keys to the understanding 
of that event. 
21 





VOTING PATTERNS IN THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 
OF i860 
The election of i860 clearly defined the party 
platforms.in Georgia, and as such, provides an 
excellent basis for attempts to define two points 1 
first, who were the elements in Georgian society 
that most strongly supported the Southern Democracy, 
the party most vocal in support of secession in the 
event of Lincoln's election, and which groups were 
affiliated with the less headstrong Constitutional 
Union and Northern Democratic positions! and secondly, 
did those elements in society hold firm in their 
parties' platform position after the election and 
during the political chaos that led up to the 
Milledgeville Convention in January of 1861. The 
first question, party support, is the basis for the 
following analysis which attempts to define that 
support through the use of averages, correlation, 
and factor analysis, 
TABLES EIGHT, NINE and TEN summarize the main 
characteristics of the ten counties with the greatest 
percentile support for the three political factions 
in the election of i860 in Georgia. It attempts to 
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define party suppport on the basis of average values 
of seven variables' 
The ten counties with the strongest percentage 
vote for the Southern Democratic Party are seen 
as areas v/ith less than average numbers of slaveholders, 
less than the average number of slaves, a lower 
cotton production per slave, larger numbers of small 
farms, and a younger average population. The strongest 
supporters of Southern Democracy were either in the 
tidewater ( Camden and Glynn counties ), the newer 
cotton lands (Miller and Wilcox counties), or the 
pine barrens and mountain counties of the state (Ware, 
Haralson, Rabun, Gilmer, Bullock, and Franklin 
counties). The older and intermediate cotton counties 
were not represented among the ten strongest Southern 
Democratic counties. 
Examination of TABLE ELEVEN shows that 969S 
of the twenty-five counties with the largest numbers 
of small farms in the state supported the Southern 
Democratic Party. TABLE TWELVE indicates that the largest 
rice-producing counties also supported Southern 
Democracy in i860. 
Averages would seem to indicate that the most 
vocal advocate of secession in the event of Lincoln's 
election, the Southern Democracy, derived its strongest 
support from the tidewater, and the newer, less 
desirable areas of the state where the younger population 
U3 
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Montgomery 84.7 32.6 27.2 75.8 05.2 00.4 13.9 
Laurens 72.3 46.8 29.8 58.2 00.0 10.7 14.5 
Greene 68.8 66.3 58.6 21.2 00.0 10.7 19.^ 
Troup 65.5 61.6 51.3 24.8 00.0 15.1 19.^ 
Upson 65.4 49.3 47.1 44.2 00.0 9.9 15.8 
Harris 62.0 56.3 42.3 35.7 00.0 13.6 17.6 
Morgan 59.7 70.1 59.1 19.5 00.0 14,0 17.9 
Macon 59.5 57.4 53.9 46.2 24.0 15.8 16.5 
Hancock 59.3 67.5 ^5.9 31.6 00.0 15.1 19.3 
Clarice 57.7 50.4 23.9 
53.^ 
44.5 00.0 3.8 18.1 
AVERAGE 64.0 58.5 38.6 2.3 10.8 17.6 
TABLE  NINE 
THE TEN COUNTIES WITH THE GREATEST NORTHERN DEMOCRATIC 
PARTY VOTE  IN i860 GEORGIA 
(Same categories as TABLE EIGHT above) 
Glascock 70.3 31.3 28.1 65.6 00.0 4.9 14.3 
Warren 59.1 54.8 46.5 86.3 00.0 10.4 15.9 
Columbia 57.2 69.9 57.5 3^.3 00.0 12.8 17.9 
Taliaferro 5^.7 62.2 68.0 46.1 00.0 9.2 20.7 
Elbert 52.6 5^.8 43.9 5^.7 00.0 6.0 16.9 
Richmond ^5.7 39.4 26.8 72.3 01.3 0.9 17.8 
Jefferson 43.1 59.1 46.8 49.3 00.0 13.4 15.8 
Lincoln 36.1 67.0 62.3 21.4 00.0 11.2 19.8 
Burke 27.2 70.3 61.3 28.0 02.9 22.9 16.4 
Putnam 25.2 70.5 55.3 8.7 00.0 20.8 19.5 
AVERAGE 45.6 58.2 53.0 39.1 00.8 9.4 17.3 
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TABLE TEN 
THE TEN COUNTIES WITH THE GREATEST SOUTHERN DEMOCRATIC 




w                a u 
•H <n       a)           on) 
H r-l  >>   O  >»        -H  0) 
*-i o Kl iH   .r4 rH          -P >« 
S £ o rq-ri «-H       cd 
>> <o c3 ? CO «-« e      s      r-io 
>H +> > Pt, O  01 f~? C ro   co cd       3-3- to 
EH u Rj <D U u in o CM -a (x,       p,     w> 
z Rl  0) rH <H+> > ci a> o> +»      c;          o ho; Ph    3h          (U  0) £> fXi +» C/l O  «J ClJ rt,T) u 
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Bullock 100.0 38.1 36.1 66.8 2.3        52 14.9 
Glynn 99.1 72.9 54.9 48.9 3.4 23750 23.0 
Rabun 91.9 6.3 7.6 86.1 0.0  00000  14.0 
Wilcox 91.0 19.9 17.5 79.6 2.8         29 14.0 
Miller 89.2 35.8 26.3 59.7 4.8            9 12.9 
Ware 85.9 17.2 15.0 35.1 0.4         62  11.2 
Camden 85.5 76.3 54.9 45.0 2.4  38925 17*6 
Haralson 85.0 7.6 10.8 83.5 •  1.3 00000 16.0 
Franklin 83.9 17.8 17.3 80.8 0.7 00000  15.9 
Giltner 83.7 2.5 2.7 90.1 0.1 00000 15.6 
AVERAGE 87.9 30.1 21.1 75.7 1.2     2924  15.3 
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TABLE ELEVEN 
STATISTICS OF THE TWENTY-.FIVE COUNTIES WITH THE 
GREATEST NUMBERS OF FARMS UNDER 100 ACRES IN i860 
County %  Small 
Farms 
%  Vote 
S.D.P. 
%  Vote 
C.U.P. 






























































































































AVERAGE 85.4 65.5 27.6 17.7 
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TABLE TWELVE 
STATISTICS OF THE SEVEN GREATEST RICE-PRODUCING 
COUNTIES IN GEORGIA IN i860 
County 95 Small 
Farms 
%  Vote 
S.D.P. 






































AVERAGE 64.7 68.1 24.2 57.8 
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owned smaller farms with fewer slaves. 
Support for the Northern Democratic and 
Constitutional Union Party positions, as seen in 
TABLES EIGHT and NINE, appears to have been derived 
from groups with basically the same geographic and 
economic positions. Both parties'greatest supporters 
were in counties that had a majority of slaves, 
large numbers of slaveholders, a minority of farms 
under 100 acres, substantial cotton production, 
and little rice agriculture. The populations of these 
counties would appear to have been slightly older, 
than those of Southern Democratic support. 
Unlike the Southern Democracy, the strongest 
supporters of the more moderate parties would appear 
to have been located in the piedmont cotton counties. 
The Northern Democratic Party found its support 
strongest in the older cotton areas clustered west 
and northwest of Augusta, Georgia, while the Union 
Party found its chief support in the cotton counties 
in central and western, but not southwestern, Georgia. 
Cotton counties were fairly split in their 
party affiliations. Thirteen of Georgia's greatest 
cotton-producing counties in I860 supported the 
Southern Democracy, while twelve supported the other 
two parties. The balance of the piedmont counties 
split their votes with no party receiving a majority 
(See MAP NINE). 
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MAP SIGHT 
THE COUNTY VOTE 
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Map EIGHT shows the geographic distribution of the 
i860 party votes. , 
The election of i860 was not unusual in its 
geographical outcome. It followed a pattern long 
established within the state. Tahles THIRTEEN, 
FOURTEEN, and FIFTEEN show that definite patterns 
had been established in the ten counties giving 
the greatest support for each party in i860. The 
Constitutional Union and Northern Democratic areas 
found strength in traditionally Whig areas of 
Georgia, while Southern Democracy was strongest in 
counties that had previously voted Democratic. 
To test the hypothesis that Southern Democratic 
support came from the small farmers and rice planters 
of the state thirty-five variables for 132 counties1 
1 . 
The variables used weretDouglas, Breckenridge, 
and Bell votes {%) t  fo  slave 5 %  of white, male adults 
20-30 years, 30-40 years, and over kO  years; %  of 
white adult males owing slaves; value of farms per 
improved acre; %  of farms over and under 100 acres; 
dollars invested in manufacturing; gross income from 
manufacturing; number of free blacks; number of cotton 
bales produced; %  of Methodists, Baptists, Presbyterians; 
number of families; number of swine; number of bushels 
of wheat; %  vote for anti-secession delegates to 
Milledgeville; pigs per white adult male; cotton bales 
per white, adult male; Baptist, Roman Catholic, 
Jewish, and Methodist seating accomodation per white, 
adult male; bushels of corn per white, adult male; % 
of white, adult males engaged in manufacturing; county 
age; pounds of rice per white, adult male, Data from 
the Eighth'Census, and Burnham, Presidential Ballots, 
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*TABLE THIRTEEN 
VOTING RECORD OP THE TEN COUNTIES WITH THE GREATEST 
CONSTITUTIONAL UNION VOTE i 
IN i860 
1840 1844 1848 1852 1856 I860 
Montgomery Whig Whig Whig K-N Am. C.Union 
Laurens Whig Whig Whig K-N Am. C.Union 
Greene Whig Whig Whig Whig Am. C.Union 
Troup Whig Whig Whig Whig Am. C.Union 
Upson Whig Whig Whig Whig Am. C.Uni on 
Harris ■ Whig Whig Whig Whig Am. C.Union 
Morgan Whig Whig Whig Demo. Am. C.Union 
Macon Whig Whig Whig Demo. Am. C.Union 
Hancock Whig Whig Whig Whig Am. C.Union 
Clarke Whig Whig Whig K-N Am. C.Union 
TABLE  FOURTEEN 
VOTING RECORD OF THE TEN COUNTIES WITH THE GREATEST 
NORTHERN DEMOCRATIC VOTE 
IN i860 
1840 1844 1848 1852 1856 I860 
Glascock Whig Whig Whig Demo/ Demo/ N.Demo. 
K-N Am. 
Warren Whig Whig Whig Derao. Demo. N.Derao. 
Columbia Whig Whig Whig Whig Demo. N.Demo. 
Taliaferro Whig Whig Whig K-N Demo. N.Demo. 
Elbert Whig Whig Whig K-N Demo. N.Demo. 
Richmond Whig Whig Whig Demo. Demo. N.Demo. 
Jefferson Whig Whig Whig K-N Demo. C.Union 
Lincoln Whig Whig Whig Deno. Demo. C.Union 
Burke Whig Whig Whig Derno. Demo. S.Demo. 
Putnam Whig Whig Whig Demo. Demo. C.Union 
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TABLE FIFTEEN 
VOTING RECORDS OF THE TEN COUNTIES WITH THE GREATEST 
SOUTHERN DEMOCRATIC VOTE 
IN i860 
1840 1844  1848  1852 I856 i860 
Bullock Demo. Demo. Demo. Demo. Demo* S.Demo, 
G ly nn Whig Whig Whig Demo, Demo. S.Demo. 
Rabun Demo, Demo. Demo. Demo. Demo. S.Demo. 
Wilcox Demo. Demo. Demo. Demo, Demo. S.Demo. 
Miller Demo. Demo. Demo. Demo. Demo. S.Demo. 
Ware Whig Whig Whig Demo. Demo. S.Demo. 
Caraden Demo. Demo, Demo. Demo, Demo. S.Demo. 
Haralson Whig/ 
Demo Demo. Demo. . Demo. Demo. S.Demo. 
Franklin Demo. Demo. Demo. Demo. Demo. S.Demo. 
Gilraer Demo. Demo. Demo. K-N Demo. S.Demo. 
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were correlated with voting in the i860 election. 
While comparison of averages depends upon the 
selection of one variable upon which counties may be 
compared, correlation of variables allows the 
observation of relationships between all varaibles 
without having to select any one variable as the 
basis for comparison.  All variables are compared 
with each other and the results allow the selection 
of trends. 
As shown in Table SIXTEEN, the Constitutional 
Union Party vote was found to correlate significantly 
with those variables associated with the cotton 
production systemi numbers of slaves, numbers of 
slaveowners, cotton bales produced, large farms, and 
numbers of swine and corn. As these variables 
increased in value, Constitutional Union vote also 
increased. 
When the nineteen largest cotton-producing 
counties were isolated from the remainder of the state 
and an analysis performed using the same variables, 
it was demonstrated that the Constitutional Union 
Party vote correlate significantly with large farms (i.e. 
farms over 100 acres), men over forty years of age, 
and cotton bales produced per white, adult male. 
















' • TABLE SIXTEEN 
SIGNIFICANT CORRELATIONS OF VARIABLES WITH POLITICAL 
PARTIES IN THE i860 ELECTION 
Variable     Northern   Southern   Constitutional 
Democratic Democratic Union 
1,%  Slave 





5.%  Farms Over 
100 Acres 




9.f° Of White, 
Adult Males 
20-30 Years 
Of Age .211 
10.# Of White, 
Adult Males 
Over 40 Years 
Of Age .272 
11.Pounds Of Rice 
Per White, Adult 
Male 
12,Roman Catholic 
Seating Ace. Per 
White, Adult 
Male . .362 
13.Methodist Seat 
Ace. Per White, 
Adult Male 
14.Episcopal Seat 




16.# Voters in 
Delegate Elections/ 









the Constitutional'Union Party, but in the newer 
cotton lands in southwest Georgia it was the counties 
with more older residents, and greater production 
of cotton that supported the more moderate party 
position. TABLE SEVENTEEN shows the results of this 
analysis. 
The Southern Democratic Party was typified most 
often by negative correlations as shown on TABLE 
SIXTEEN. It was not the party associated with those 
factors representational of the cotton system and 
was strongest in areas of small farms and rice 
production. In the analysis of the nineteen greatest 
cotton producing counties in i860, only small farms 
correlated positively with Southern Democratic vote, 
negative correlations being found with older men, 
percentage of slaveholders, and cotton bales produced. 
The Northern Democratic Party, while appearing 
to find support from the same areas as the Unionist 
Party, correlated significantly with the Roman Catholic 
Church and with older men. This suggests that 
Northern Democratic vote was concentrated in the older 
areas of the state where the few Roman Catholic churches 
were located. 
It should be noted that a strong polarity 
existed between the Constitutional Union and Southern 
Democratic Parties. Areas that supported one gave 
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TABLE SEVENTEEN 
SIGNIFICANT CORRELATIONS OP VARIABLES WITH POLITICAL 
PARTIES IN i860  AMONG GEORGIA'S NINETEEN LARGEST 
COTTON-PRODUCING COUNTIES1 
Variable Northern   Southern   Constitutional 
Democratic Democratic Union 
•fo  Farms Under     -.326 
100 Acres 
$ Slave Owners 
%  Of White, 
Adult Males Over   .661 
40 Years of Age 
fo  Of White, 
Adult Males 20-   -.426 











Dougherty, Charlton, Lee, Houston, Baker, Twiggs, 
Stewart, Burke, Early, Putnam, Hancock, Jones, 
Talbot, Crawford, Monroe, Sumpter, Macon, Calhoun, 
Meriwether. Only Burke, Putnam, Hancock, Jones, and 
Monroe could be considered older cotton counties. 
The others were newer cotton counties. 
Correlations and statistical data derived using 
Palchak, Andrew, and Frank W. Koko, Lehigh Amalgamated 
Package for Statistics, (LEAPS), Bethlehem, Pa., 1971. 
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little support to the other. Because of the polarity, 
a factor analysis was performed on the variables to 
attempt to isolate them into meaningful clusters. 
Y/hen analyses were performed using differing numbers 
of factors, it was found that Georgia's thirty-five 
variables best fit three factors. 
The three factors developed (See TABLE EIGHTEEN) 
appear to closely fit the hypothesis under considera- 
tion. Factor One appears to contain all the variables 
identified with cotton agriculture in Georgiai numbers 
of slaves and slaveholders, numbers of cotton bales, 
large farms, pig and corn production. Collectively 
as Factor One these variables are seen to correlate 
positively with Constitutional Union, and negatively 
with Southern Democratic vote in TABLE NINETEEN. 
Factor Two appears to be constructed of those 
variables indicative of rice agricultures rice grown, 
money invested in manufacturing (primarily plants to 
process rice, cotton, turpentine, and molasses, gross 
income from such manufacturing, numbers of Presbyterians 
and Episcopals, and the number of white males engaged in 
manufacturing. The party is seen to negatively relate 
to Constitutional Union vote, but positively correlate 
with Southern Democratic vote in i860. 
Factor Three would appear to be primarily 
an urban factor, correlating with Jewish and free 
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TABLE EIGHTEEN 
FACTORS AND COMPONENT VARIABLES 
FACTOR ONE FACTOR TWO 
Load ing       Variable Loading Variable 
.87 Cotton/white adult 
Male 
.78 $ Invested in 
Manufacturing 
.87 %  Slaveholders 
.73 Gross income 
from Manufacturing 
.85 %  Slaves 
.69 Pounds Rice/ 




.85 Cotton Bales .69 Workers in 
Manufacturing 
.84 Indian Corn/ 
white, adult Male .64 Episcopal Seat 
Ace. Per white, 




%  White, adult ■. 
,48 Methodist Ace/ 
white, adult Male 
Males over 40 
years of age 
.34 Baptist Ace/ White, .49 %  Non-Methodist 
adult Male Baptist/ White, 
Adult male 
FACTOR THREE 
.81 Jewish Seat. Ace/ White, adult male 
.76 %  white, adult males 20-30 years of age 
.75 free blacks 
.71 Value of farms / improved acre 
.67 Number of families 
.66 %  of white, adult males 30-40 years of age 
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TABLE NINETEEN 
CORRELATION OP THREE FACTORS WITH POLITICAL PARTIES 
IN THE i860 ELECTION 
Northern Southern Constitutional 
Democratic Democratic Union 
FACTOR ONE       -.3^2 .400 
FACTOR TWO       .270 -.210 
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blacks.  As Chatham County, the location of 
Savannah, had the only Jewish seating accomodations 
in the state, and the largest number of free blacks, 
the Factor would appear to have been influenced by 
its urban population. As it did not correlate with 
any political party in i860, it is being dropped 
from further consideration in this study. 
No single factor would appear to have been 
associated exclusively with the small farmers of the 
state, and probably for the reason that no variables 
were totally typical of small farmers except for 
farms under 100 acres. The plain folk of the south 
were too widely spread, too varied in their jobs, 
to have been considered a single factor. As previously 
discussed, the small folk of the south were engaged 
in cotton production in the black belt, some as 
livestock producers and tradesmen in the mountains, 
and others throughout the south just existed as 
sustenance farmers or tenants on the lands of  others. 
The use of averages, multiple correlation, and 
factor analysis has substantiated the hypothesis that 
the affluent tidewater and mountains and pine barrens 
counties were the strongest in the support of the 
Southern Democracy, while the Constitutional Union 
Party gained its support from those Georgian counties 
associated with the production of cotton, and more 
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specifically those in central and northeastern 
piedmont areas. The Northern Democracy would appear 
to have drawn support in the urban areas. 
The political situation in Georgia in the 
post election days of i860 was basically an alliance 
between rice aristocrats and small, slaveless farmers 
opposed to the cotton planters in the older areas of 
the state. It was an unusual alignment, pitting two 
groups with a common slaveholding interest against 
each other. The election for delegates to the 




THE LAST REFERENDUM 
Shortly after Lincoln's election the Legislature 
k of Georgia approved Governor Brown's earlier request        f\
for the election of delegates to meet at the state * 
capital on January 16, 1861. The defined purpose of 
that meeting was to decide Georgia's fate in the 
Union, 
Georgia's citizens were charged with the 
responsibility of the election of delegates to the 
convention, and basically the elections themselves, 
and not future acts of the delegates, determined 
Georgia's future in the Republic. The delegate 
elections were the last opportunity the electorate 
had to express its views on secession. 
Most of the state's counties offered two delegate 
slates, one secessionist and one cooperationist or 
unionist.  Politicians of both local and national 
reputation actively campaigned throughout Georgia 
for the local slates that best represented their 
t _ ^  
1 
Letter of Governor Joseph E. Brown to A. J. 
Whitten, J. H. Callaway, and others of Murray County, 
April 25, 1861 in the Milledgeville (Georgia) 
Southern Federal Union , April 2 5, 186l. Collections 
of the University of Georgia, Athens, Georgia. 
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views on the crisis, and were aware of support or 
weakness for their positions in areas all over the 
state.  The vote of the populace on January 2, 1861 
finally settled the issue that had smoldered for so 
long. The 
delegates to the Convention who voted 
for the ordinance of secession were 
elected by a clear majority in the State 
of 13,120 votes.3 
The election of delegates and the subsequent 
convention vote were, however, not quite as simple 
as Governor Brown indicated. Low voter turnouts, 
changes in position appearing inconsistent with earlier 
party vote, and competition levels throughout the state 
call for a further examination of the delegate election. 
2 
Dear Brotheri By all means come directly 
to Athens or else send me a list of 
appointments for you to speak in the 
following counties - Franklin, Dawson, 
Habersham, Union, Lumpkin, Porsyth, Hall 
and Gwinnett. There is trouble above here, 
and no  one but yourself can quell it. 
Thomas R. R. Cobb to Howell Cobb, December 15, i860, 
in "The Correspondence of Robert Toombs, Alexander 
Stephens, and Howell Cobb", Annual Report of the 
American Historical Association for the Year 1911> 
Olrich B. Phillips, ed.,2 vola. {Washington, 1913), 
p.522. This source is filled with letters indicating 
that these major figures were active in efforts to 
influence the outcome of the delegate elections. 
3 
Brown letter in Milledgeville Southern Federal 




COMPETITION LEVELS IN THE ELECTION OF DELEGATES 
The January elections did not generate the 
voter turnout experienced in the i860 presidential 
election. In i860 the numbers of male voters 
approximated 8jfo  of the white, adult males in the 
state, or 97%  of the heads of families. In January 
of 1861 the total vote was only 81.8# of the turnout 
for the presidential contest, and equal to only 67.9% 
of the white, adult males or 79,k% of  the family 
heads. Initial appearances indicate a lack of voter 
interest in the election, yet further analysis shows 
that this was not the entire situation. 
Nineteen counties registered less than 60%  of 
their total i860 vote in the delegate elections, 
averaging ^8.8$ of the earlier contest. The great 
majority of these counties (89.5$) were located in 
the older or newer cotton areas of the state. All but 
three had previously voted for the Southern Democracy. 
TABLE TWENTY presents this group. 
TABLE TWENTY-ONE shows the twenty-two counties 
that had more voters in the 1861 election than in the 
presidential contest, averaging 130.3%  of the earlier 
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TABLE TWENTY 
COUNTIES IN WHICH THE LEAST VOTES WERE CAST FOR THE 
DELEGATE ELECTIONS COMPARED WITH THEIR VOTES IN THE 
I860 PRESIDENTIAL VOTE 
County     1861 vote/ Geographic i860  Ordinance 







































Old cotton Co.Un. Against 
it    ii  11 So.De. For 
H         II    II n   11 11 
New "  " II   11 11 
•1        H    M it   n 11 
P. Barrens 11   ■• 11 
Old Cotton No.De. n 
New Cotton So.De. 11 
H       II       II II  11 n 
n    »    11 11  n H 
Old Cotton No.De. II 
M       II       H 11  H Against 
New Cotton So.De. For 
Old Cotton Co.Un. •1 
New Cotton So.De. H 
Old Cotton 11  II n 
New Cotton 11    H •• 
Tidewater H   n II 
New Cotton II    H •1 
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TABLE TWENTY-ONE 
COUNTIES IN WHICH MORE VOTES WERE CAST IN THE DELEGATE 
ELECTIONS THAN IN THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF i860 IN 
GEORGIA 
County     1861 vote/ Geographic i860  Ordinance 
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Int.Cotton 







II        H    H 
Mountains 











H     11 
So.De. 
Co.Un. 

























vote. Approximately 75%  of these counties had earlier 
showed Southern Democratic preference, the majority 
being located in the mountains or pine barrens regions. 
Over 71# of the included cotton counties were in the 
intermediate areas, having previously indicated 
Constitutional Union support. 
Fifteen of the low turnout areas had offered the 
citizens only one delegate slate, and their competition 
values3, were naturally very low, averaging 93»6#. 
The higher turnout areas averaged 3.8$ competition, 
and all but one offered two slates of delegates in 
the election. 
TABLES TWENTY-TWO through TWENTY-FIVE indicate 
that competition was greatest in the mountain, pine 
barrens, and intermediate cotton counties. As would 
have been expected, counties whose delegates rejected 
the Ordinance demonstrated a greater degree of 
competition than did those whose delegates supported 
secession. Only in Georgia's mountain counties did 
1 
Competition values were calculated by subtracting 
the percentages of votes given to one slate from the 
percentages given to the other slate of delegates. 
Thus, a county with both slates receiving SOfo  of the 
vote would have the greatest competition value of 0$, 
while one with a 99$ to 1%  vote would have been given 
a value of 98$, very low. Competition values of 
100^ indicate that only one slate was presented to 
the voters, and obviously, there was no  competition. 
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TABLE TWENTY-TWO 
COMPETITION INDEX VALUES FOR COUNTY DELEGATE ELECTION 
VOTES COMPARED WITH i860 MAJORITY PARTY VOTE AND THE 
DELEGATES POSITION ON THE ORDINANCE OF SECESSION 
THE COUNTIES WHOSE DELEGATES 
WERE FOR THE ORDINANCE OF 
SECESSION 
Party in i860      Number of   Competition 





Democratic 5 5^.6 
Constitutional 
Union 19 39.^ 
THE COUNTIES WHOSE DELEGATES 
WERE AGAINST THE ORDINANCE OF 
SECESSION 














competition levels, in pro-Ordinance counties approach 
that of anti-Ordinance areas. 
TABLE TWENTY-TWO indicates that competition 
was greatest in former Constitutional Union counties 
where secession delegates were elected, and in former 
Southern Democratic Party and Constitutional Union 
Party counties where elected delegates would reject 
the Ordinance of Secession. 
Competition and turnout evaluation indicate 
that the delegate elections did not reflect a lack 
of voter interest, but rather reflected an accurate 
awareness of the local political situation. Where 
substantial differences of opinion existed on the 
question of secession, turnout and competition were 
high. Where there was general agreement on the issue, 
turnout was low and competition was low or non- 
existant. In general, large voter turnout and great 
competition indicated anti-secession sentiment, 
especially in former Constitutional Union area3 of the 
state, or in the mountains, pine barrens, and 
intermediate cotton areas. 
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TABLE TWENTY-THREE 
SUMMARY OF STATISTICS OF COUNTIES WHOSE DELEGATES 
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TIDEWATER 82.3# So.Dem. 59.6 82.3 59.6 
0.0 No.Dem. 0.0 
0.0 C.Union 0.0 
PINE  BARRENS 93.9 So.Dem 40.2 93.9 40.2 
0.0 No.Dem. 0.0 
0.0 C.Union 0.0 
OLD COTTON 68.3 So.Dem. 61.8 69.1 54.2 
69.6 No.Dem. 54.6 












NEW  COTTON 68.2 So.Dem. 55.0 69.4 50.2 
0.0 No.Dem. 0.0 
73.^ C.Union 3^.2 
MOUNTAINS 87.7 So.Dem. 23.8 84.4 20.2 
0.0 No.Dem. 0.0 
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IN THE AREA 
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PINE BARRENS 144.6 16.0 93.9 40.2 105.5 20.2 
MOUNTAINS 100.0 24.2 84.4 20.2 98.2 19.0 
TIDEWATER 0.0 0.0 82.3 59.6 82.3 59.6 
INTERMEDIATE 
COTTON 96.6 16.0 77.9 40.2 86.0 15.8 
NEW COTTON 94.6 3o6 69.4 50.2 73.5 41.6 
OLD COTTON i ?3.8 21.2 69.1 54.2 70.8 27.4 
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B. 
A COMPARISON QF i860 POLITICAL PARTY 
WITH VOTE FOR CONVENTION 
DELEGATES 
In the election of delegates to the Milledgeville 
Convention.the Northern Democratic Party counties 
demonstrated an abandonment of their previous moderate 
position in reference to secession. Only three of 
the ten counties with the greatest percentage vote 
in i860 (TABLE NINEX and one of the six counties that 
gave a majority vote to Northern Democracy (Taliaferro) 
elected delegates pledged to anti-secession positions. 
The delegates"to Milledgeville voted in much the 
same spirit in which they were elected! six ( five 
previous Northern Democratic majority counties) voted 
to support the Ordinance of Secession, and four were 
fully or partly against its ratification. Burke County, 
previously having given a majority to the Southern 
Democracy, voted against the Ordinance even though its 
delegates had been elected on a secessionist slate. 
Unlike the poor Northern Democratic showing in 
I860, Constitutional Union votes carried forty-one 
of Georgia's counties. Seventeen of these counties 
elected delegates pledged to cooperationist or unionist 
positions. They were later joined in their opposition 
to the Ordinance by four delegations originally 
elected as immediate secessionists. 
Like the Northern Democratic counties, the 
Constitutional Union areas that retained their moderate 
stance were primarily located in the older and 
intermediate piedmont areas of the state. Intermediate 
cotton areas saw 66.7# and older cotton counties 50»0# 
of their former Constitutional Union counties reject 
the Ordinance of Secession. The situation was reversed 
in the newer cotton areas where ?5# of the former 
Constitutional Union counties voted in favor of the 
secession document. 
The Southern Democratic Party received a plurality 
or a majority in eighty-five of Georgia's counties in 
i860, primarily in the tidewater, mountains, pine 
barrens, and newer cotton areas of the state. In the 
delegate elections, 69 of the 85 counties (81.2#) 
elected delegations pledged to secession. However, 
only 5^ of the delegate groups were to fully support 
the ratification of the Ordinance. While only two 
of the top ten Southern Democratic vote getters in 
i860 (TABLE TEN) elected slates pledged to unionist 
or cooperationsist positions, four of these counties 
ultimately partially or fully rejected the Ordinance. 
The mountain counties accounted for the greatest 
1^5 
numbers of defections from the secessionist stance of 
the Southern Democracy. Over 90$ of the mountain county 
delegations voted against secession, a figure that 
equaled 61,'}%  of all antirecession counties of former 
Southern Democratic support. The former Southern 
Democratic counties in the pine barrens gave only 
35.7# of their ranks to the anti-Ordinance position, 
while the cotton counties contributed even less 
support. Together, the pine barrens and cotton areas 
represented 75.3# of all Southern Democratic counties, 
yet they gave less than 39# of the unionist or co- 
operationist support at Milledgeville. The tidewater 
gave no support to the minority position through its 
elected delegates. 
As previous voter turnout and competition studies 
have indicated, the Southern Democratic Party was an 
effective secession indicator, except where turnout 
was high or competition levels were great, especially 
in the mountain counties. The Constitutional Union 
Party in areas of higher competition within the cotton 
belt represented the major piedmont source of anti- 
secession sentiment. TABLES TWENTY-SIX and TWENTY- 




GEORGIA COUNTIES' POLITICAL AFFILIATION COMPARED 
WITH DELEGATIONS ELECTED AND FINAL VOTE ON THE 
ORDINANCE OF SECESSION 















































TABLE TWENTY-SIX (Continued) 

























TABLE  TWENTY-SRVBn 
*   SUN.MAHY  OP   I860,   DELEGATE.   A .'D CO TRANCE  VOTE 
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Pine Barrona  14 
Mountainn?   26 
Older Cotton1* 31 
Intermediate 23 
Cotton' 
New Cotton0 31 
100.0  100.0    0.0  100.0     0.0 0.0 
85.7    64.3 35.7 100.0    0.0 0.0 
38.5    tl.5 68.J    80.7 19,3 0.0 
71.0    64.5 35.5    29.0 51.6 19.4 
78.3    56.5 43.5    47.5 52.5 0.0 
93.5    80.6 19.4     74.2 25.8 0.0 
Caraden. Efflngham, Bryan, Chatham, Clynn, 
Mclntosh, and Liberty 
2 
Brooks, Lownden, Echols, Clinch, Ware, Chariton, 
Colqultt, Berrien, Coffee, Irwin, Appling, Pierce, 
Tatnnll, and Wayne. 
3 
Banks, Cass, Cattoosa, Chatoora, Cherokee,Dade, 
Dawson, Fannin, rloyd, Franklin, Fcrcyth, Gilmer, 
Gordon, Habershan, Hall, Lunpkin, Kilton, Murray, 
Pickens, Polk, Rabun, Union, Towns, ViUor, White, 
Whitfield 
4 
Madison, Hart, Elbert, Oglethorpe, Lincoln, 
Wilkea, Morgan, Greene, Taliaferro, Columbia, Warron, 
Glaacock, Hancock, Putnam, Jones, BaLdwin, Washington, 
Jefferson, Burke, Screven, Bullock. Ei-.anuel, Laurena, 
Konts;o.T.ery, Pulaaki. Telfair, TwLsga, Wilkenaon, 
Johnson, and Richmond 
Fulton, DeKalb, Gwlnnett, Jackson, Fayette, 
Clayton, Henry, Newton, Walton, Spiuldlos, Pike, 
Upaon, Monroe, Butts, Jasper, Taylor, Crawford, 
Bibb, Macon, Houston, Dooly, Wllcox, Worth. 
6 
Haralson, Pauldln*. Cobb, Campbell, Carroll, 
Heard, Coweta, Troup, Keriwothor, Harris, Talbot, 
Karlon, Schloy, Su-ipter, Webster, Stewart, Quitnara, 
Chattahooohoe .Rsndoloh, Terrell, Lee,   Clay, Calhoun, 
Early, Bauer, Miller, Mitchell, Eecatur, Troup, 




THE DELEGATE ELECTIONS IN THE COTTON COUNTIES OF 
GEORGIA 
Georgia's eighty-five cotton-producing counties 
were the key to the election of secession delegates 
to the Milledgeville convention. They contained the 
majority of the state's voters, and they controlled 
any action the convention was to take. 
The cotton counties with population declines 
from 1850 to i860 have previously been established 
(Tables FIVE) as more representational of the cotton 
system 1 they had more slaveholders , more large farms, 
and more slaves per family than did counties gaining 
in population during the same period. The loss in 
population has been attributed to an outmigration 
of small farmers, non-farmers, or non-landowners. 
Tables TWENTY-EIGHT and THIRTY indicate that 
cotton counties .losing population were generally more 
strongly in favor of secession delegates to the 
convention, however, they also indicate that those 
counties of this type whose delegates rejected the 
Ordinance were less secessionist that were counties 
gaining in population whose delegates also rejected 
the Ordinance as seen in Tables TWENTY-NINE and THIRTY- 
0NE
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Competition was greatest in the anti-Ordinance 
counties as previously established, however it is 
seen in the tables to be greatest in cotton counties 
with population growth between 1850 and i860. 
Cotton counties voting for secession had 
slightly larger numbers of small farmers and non- 
farmowners than did cooperationist or unionist areas. 
Anti-secession counties in older and intermediate 
cotton areas showed a comparative decrease in both 
slaves per family and cotton production per slave 
except in the older cotton counties with population 
increases. 
The tables have demonstrated that anti-secession 
sentiment in the cotton belt was concentrated in 
areas typified by slightly more large farms, more 
land and farmowners, slaves, and cotton production, 
areas previously established as the Constitutional 
Union areas of the state. Table THIRTY-TWO indicates 
that although cotton culture in general correlated 
with secession, Constitutional Union or Northern 
Democratic vote in I860 indicated anti-secession 
sentiment in 186l. 
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TABLE TWENTY-EIGHT 
STATISTIC OF THE COTTON-PRODUCING COUNTIES LOSING 
POPULATION BY GEOGRAPHICAL AREA AND POSITION ON THE 
ORDINANCE OF  SECESSION 
cd 4)               O X o 
a) «-i W              .-♦ 0) o 
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OLD COTTON 
Pro-Ordinance + 38.2 - 55.4 73.0 66.0 86.5 29.9 
Anti-Ordinance - 28.3 - 59.9 33.0 70.1 33.5 36.8 
INT. COTTON 
Pro-Ordinance - 41.0 + 6l. 3 51.2 66.0 75.6 41.2 
Anti-Ordinance - 20.5 - 56.1 21.2 104. 39.4 26.5 
NEW COTTON 
Pro-Ordinance - 43.3 - 62.3 61.2 66.4 80.6 43.7 
Anti-Ordinance ♦ 17.4 + 57.2 3.4 121. 51.7 34.6 
66.0 67.7 83.O 35.6 
24.4 87.0 37.8 33.5 
AVERAGE OF ALL 
Pro-Ordinance 
Anti-Ordinance 
1 ~~ " 
"relative increase" and "relative change" are 
comparison of the area data with statewide values 
for the factor. Greater than statewide, therefore,is +, 
and less than statewide is -. 
TABLE TWENTY-NINE 
STATISTICS OF THE COTTON-PRODUCING COUNTIES GAINING 
POPULATION  BY GEORGRAPHICAL AREA  AND POSITION ON THE 
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« C/J^R> QSo \fcs c/i 0 rHltH ^S.OT ^< 
OLD  COTTON 
Pro-Ordinance - 103. + 70.2 42.4 72.2 71.2 58.0 
Anti-Ordinance - 122. + 64.4 8.0 76.0 46.0 55,3 
INT. COTTON 
Pro-Ordinance + 88.7 + 72.9 29.4 78.6 64.7 60.1 
Anti-Ordinance - 27.4 - 72.5 18.8 9^.8 40.6 53.8 
NEW COTTON 
Pro-Ordinance - 124. + 66.0 46.6 70.1 73.3 53.5 
Anti-Ordinance + 57.9 + 70.5 16.0 88.1 42.0 62.7 
AVERAGE OF ALL 
Pro-Ordinance 
Anti-Ordinance 
43.0 72.7 71.5 55A 
14.4 86.5 42.8 55.1 
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TABLE THIRTY 
THE  STATISTICS  OF ALL COTTON-PRODUCING  COUNTIES 
LOSING  POPULATION  1850-1860  BY GEOGRAPHIC  AREAS 
a> 
O C rt C C C 
•H O <H O O O 
Oi +»a>a>a>+><D+>a>-p 
Rj O^H        GC'H        O-H        OK-IMO) 
u o+»Co+*o+»o+> C>H 
W) d c     a> ** c; c q.r*g 
oa> T33-p+»3S3.rH3wPi 
0>  fc rHOCOOQ)OiHOOO 
o < 00    MOO    20    <:o»3a< 
% OF NON- 45.3     55.8    46.6    48.2 
FARMOWNERS 
SLAVES/FAMILY 8.7      7,1      5.1      7.5 
1850 
SLAVES/FAMILY      9.8  7.6  6.3  8.5 
i860 
%  INCREASE IN     35.4 32.8 39.0' 35.7 
CASH VALUE OF 
FARiMS 18 50-i860 
COTTON BALES/      1.5   1.4  1.5  1.5 
SLAVE 1850 
COTTON BALES/      1.3   1.7  1.7   1.5 
SLAVE i860 
%  SLAVEHOLDERS    56.4 59.2  6l,5 58.2 
WITH LESS THAN 
10 SLAVES 
1861 vote        67.2 86.8 75.5 73.1 
I8"o"0 vote 
COMPETITION       42.8 22.2  51.6 40.7 
INDEX 





THE STATISTICS OF ALL COTTON-PRODUCING COUNTIES 








































•fo  OF NON- 
FA RMOWNERS 
53.6 45.0 52.5 50.4 
SLAVES/FAMILY 
1850 
4.5 3.0 3.8 3.8 
SLAVES/FAMILY 
i860 
4.3 3.6 5.5 4.7 
%  INCREASE CASH 
VALUE OF FARMS 
1850 - i860 
111.7 53.0 121,0 100.1 
COTTON BALES/ 
SLAVE 1850 
1.0 1.3 1.9 1.5 
COTTON BALES/ 
SLAVE I860 
1.4 1.4 2.5 1.9 
%  SLAVEHOLDERS 
WITH LESS THAN 
10 SLAVES 
67,6 66.4 66.2 66.6 
1861 vote 
1860 vote 
73.8 85.8 73.0 77.0 
COMPETITION 
INDEX 
19.6 1.0 43.6 26.0 
%  OF VOTE FOR 
SECESSION 
DELEGATES 
59.8 50.6 71.8 63.0 
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TABLE THIRTY-TWO 
SIGNIFICANT CORRELATIONS OF VARIABLES AMONG THE 
NINETEEN LARGEST COTTON-PRODUCING COUNTIES IN 
GEORGIA IN i860 2 
Variable         %  Vote Against %  Vote For 
Ordinance of Anti-Secession 
Secession Delegates 





Democratic Party -j.460 
Constitutional 
Union Party .230 
%  Population 
20-30 Years 
-.325 
%  Population 






Adult Male -.240 
Slaveholders 
1861 vote 






The nineteen largest cotton-producing counties 




THE DELEGATE ELECTIONS AS INDICATORS OF SECESSION 
SENTIMENT IN GEORGIA 
Analysis of the delegate elections of January 
1861 has indicated that the main political source of 
secession sentiment in Georgia originated within the 
Southern Democratic Party counties, and that areas 
that supported that party generally supported the 
secession delegates to the Milledgeville Convention. 
The Party was the political bastion of the non- 
slaveholder, the small farmer or non-farmer, and the 
tidewater rice aristocrats. 
The unionist or cooperationist position in the 
state correlated with previous support of the 
Constitutional Union Party. That party, as previously 
established, was the party of the piedmont, and more 
specifically those areas of the piedmont most typical 
of the cotton system in the intermediate and older 
cotton counties. 
The strongest anti-secession area of the state 
was the mountains, sending an overwhelming number 
of delegations to Milledgeville pledged to unionist 
or cooperationist positions. However, 44.7# of the 
mountain voters indicated a preference for pro- 
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secession delegations, indicating a far from 
unanimous position among the citizens. 
The pine barrens, traditionally considered 
areas of strong anti-secession sentiment, gave 
67,9%  of their total popular vote to secession 
delegations. 
TABLE THIRTY-THREE shows that there was a strong 
numerical agreement between the numbers of non- 
farmowners and the percentages of voters expressing 
anti-secession sentiments. It is suggested that in 
the pine barrens and mountains of Georgia the farm- 
owners were the prime source of secession sentiment 
and that they ware opposed in this viewpoint by 
the non-agricultural segment of the societies. 
Within the piedmont area of the state, landowners 
and non-farmowners were more generally balanced in 
their numbers (see TABLE THIRTY-THREE). It has been 
noted previously that although the percentages of 
small landowners varied between cotton areas gaining 
and losing population (i.e. approximately "}k%  to 
55%)» within these areas the percentages were 
relatively consistent in both anti-Ordinance and 
pro-Ordinance counties. Therefore the small farmers 
would appear not to have been the critical factor 
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in the secession vote. 
Table THIRTY-THREE indicates that anti-secession 
vote decreased as the percentage of non-farmowners 
decreased. Within Constitutional Union counties 
Table THIRTY-POUR indicates that anti-secession 
vote was reflected by both the percentages of small 
farmers and non-farmers. This would explain former 
indications that the less successful of Constitutional 
Union counties were the most anti-secession in 
orientation. 
It would appear that within the piedmont the 
non-farmowners were the major source of cooperationist 
or unionist strength. However, within traditionally 
Constitutional Union areas they were joined by 
small farmers and some older slaveowners to swing 
the balance of the vote in the favor of the anti- 
secession movement. 
The tidewater of the state was the only area 
that did not follow the trend discussed above. Non- 
farmowners do not appear to relate with anti-secession 
sentiment. However, the great numbers of non-farmers 
associated with rice agriculture and its services, and 
therefore dependent on its continuation would fully 
differentiate the tidewater from the rest of the 
state. It should also be noted that three of  the 
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seven tidewater counties did not offer two delegate 
slates to the electorate, and thus did not present 
a true challenge to secession. 
In summation, secession in Georgia would appear 
not to have been simply a matter of slaveowner versus 
non-slaveowner, but more a matter of landowner or 
farmowner versus non-farmowner. It appears to have 
been an i3sue of farmer versus factory hand, laborer, 
tradesman, or shopowner. The non-farmowners were 
generally anti-secessionist, while the landowners and 
farmers tended to support secession delegates to the 
Milledgeville Convention. 
Within traditionally Constitutional Union areas 
of the state, some small landowners and slaveholders 
joined in the anti-secession efforts, but generally 
the pattern discussed, held firm. 
Competition was greatest in those areas where 
the non-landowners and non-farmers not associated 
with cotton or rice agriculture were to be found in 
numbers sufficient to have prevented secession votes 
from occurring, that is in the mountains, intermediate 
and older cotton, and certain sections of the pine 
barrens. Politically, Constitutional Union counties 
with greater numbers of small farmers and non-farm 
related citizens also reflected thi3 competition. 
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TABLE THIRTY-THREE 
ANTI-SECESSION DELEGATE VOTE COMPARED WITH LAND 
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Mountains 55.3/* 55.3^ 33.8J5 10.9# 
Intermediate 
Cotton ^5.1 48.4 27.5 24.1 
New Cotton 36.2 46.9 26.8 26.3 
Old Cotton 35.9 41.1 29.6 29.3 
Pine Barrens 32.1 30.0 53.2 16.8 




STATISTICS ON CONSTITUTIONAL UNION COUNTIES BY 
GEOGRAPHICAL AREA AND POSITION ON THE ORDINANCE 
OF SECESSION 
(PIEDMONT COUNTIES ONLY) 
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THE COUNTIES AGAINST ORDINANCE 
Old Cotton 56.9 44.4 45.6 27.4  9.4 1.5 
Int.Cotton 46.2 48.4 41.5 30.7  7.3 1.5 
New Cotton 57.9 65.0 47.6 20.1 14.4 1.9 
AVERAGE    52.3 45.9 44.0 27.7  9.0  1.5 
THE COUNTIES FOR THE ORDINANCE 
Old Cotton 59.9 60.3 43.3 19.6  9.9 1.2 
Int.Cotton 46.3 41.6 71.4 14.2  8.4 1.8 
New Cotton 56.0 53.8 44.3 21.7 14.2 2.0 
AVERAGE    55.8  54.0 49.9  19.8  11.0 1.7 
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THOUGHTS ON SECESSION IN GEORGIA 
Not all Unionists, however, were small 
farmers or hill-dwellers. Some of the 
most outspoken were large planters,,..1 
Carl Degler*s assessment of Unionist sentiment 
in his works on southern dissent appears to have 
summarized the anti-secession sentiment in Georgia 
as indicated by this study* the non-farmers or non- 
farmowners, small farmers, and non-agricultural 
workers joined some older, traditionally Constitutional 
Union and former Whig voters in the piedmont to 
oppose immediate secession. The Southern Democracy, 
tho traditional outlet for most of this section of 
Georgia's society, was rejected after the election of 
i860 as its philosophy no longer reflected its former 
supporters. 
The earliest and strongest advocates of secession 
in Georgia were the tidewater rice "aristocrats." 
Traditionally Democratic in voting as opposed to 
the Whig support of the upland planters, the tidewater 
electorate typified the southern or sectional world 
view often cited as being causative of the Civil War. 
They typified a folk culture*of the south based on 
1 
Degler, "The Peculiar Dissent of the Nineteenth 
Century South", in Young, Dissent, Explorations in 
the History of American Radicalism, p.121. 
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chivalry, slavery, and indolence. The autocratic 
nature of their world and philosophy is best seen 
in the fact that almost 60%  of their contests for 
delegates offered the electorate only one slate — 
secessionist. 
The tidewater represented the zenith of the 
plantation system in Georgia. As in neighboring 
Charleston, Georgia's tidewater planters lived a 
life based on great numbers of slaves, absentee 
management, and a philosophy of life which had long 
since lost touch with the reality of southern life 
for the large majority of its residents. 
The "aristocrats" suffered from the paranoia 
of slave revolt because they rarely worked their 
land or their slavesi they bravely suffered the 
"personal affronts" offered by northern critics until 
they felt they had suffered enough. The defense of 
an ideal, the "southern way of life", from exterior 
forces that they saw attempting to challenge and 
destroy it demanded that they take their party from 
national control, as they earlier had removed their 
churches and literature. In the tidewater areas, 
and the tidewater of Georgia only, the popular view 
of the causation of the Civil War came close to the 
reality of the situation, 
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Georgia's piedmont cotton belt had greatly 
expanded in the last three decades of the ante-bellum 
period. As lands in the older and intermediate areas 
became exhausted, the planters expanded their farms 
to include newer lands. Squatters and small farmers 
were forced to move on or voluntarily moved to 
newer, more productive, areas. The last decade of 
the period saw a great expansion of the larger farms, 
an increase in slaves, and a greater consolidation 
of wealth into the hands of the owners of the larger 
estates. 
The planters in the older counties suffering 
population declines tended to be older men, men who 
had grown up or were growing up in the era before 
nullification and the Georgia Compromise. They lived 
in areas with more trades, more commercial enterprise, 
and more.industry. They had less of the frontier 
mentality seen in the newer cotton lands in the 
southwestern areas of the state. Many had been Whigs, 
and many still continued to vote in a conservative 
fashion, supporting the Union or Constitutional 
Union Party positions. 
Although concentrations did not reach the levels 
of the tidewater areas, slavery was an integral part 
of the piedmont. However, the cotton planters and 
I65 
white population in general had a far greater 
exposure to the field slaves than did the residents 
of the tidewater. Not being usually a part of the 
absentee owner syndrome of the tidewater, the upland 
residents did not exhibit as great a paranoia in 
reference to slave revolt. The piedmont farmers were 
more aware of the abilities and characters of the 
slaves around them» and were in far greater control 
of their own chattel. 
Throughout the piedmont, tenants and small 
farmowners, factory hands and tradesmen, lived their 
lives without the personal benefit of slaves, V/hile 
all gained in status as whites, they existed, and 
flourished, without actual participation in the 
slaveholding system. Though small landowners could 
never hope to own great estates in the tidewater, 
it was possible to advance in the piedmont without 
slaves. 
The non-farmowners and non-slaveholders had 
been served well by the party of Jackson in Georgia. 
It had granted them suffrage and seemed to have 
answered their needs. Up through the election of 
i860 this element of Georgian society held firmly 
to their traditional party affiliation and its 
traditional leaders, such as small farmer Joseph 
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E. Brown. This was true even though the leaders 
increasingly came to support the values of the 
tidewater and not the common men of the state. 
Ironically, it was the support of the common 
men in Georgia that enabled the Southern Democratic 
Party to gain the strength necessary to force the 
issue of secession. After the election of I860 
the common men deserted the party and its philosophy, 
yetf by that point it had become too late. The momentum 
of the secession movement had grown to the point 
where it could not be stopped. 
The pine barrens and mountain counties saw a 
desertion of Southern Democracy for a more moderate 
stance after Lincoln's election as well* Although 
the farmowners continued to support the Southern 
Democracy, the non-farmowners and non-agricultural 
elements in these areas joined anti-secessionist 
ranks. 
Georgia was an agricultural, if not agrarian, 
society in the late ante-bellum years. Part of the 
agriculture was slave based, and perhaps a majority 
of the other agricultural population would have 
liked to have owned slaves. Yet, one half of the 
state*3 families did not own farms, and over 75# 
did not own slaves. Georgia was a growing commercial 
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and a fledgling industrial state i 25# of its families 
were tradesmen or industrial workers and did not 
relate to the slave system. 
Most of these Georgians were represented by 
Southern Democracy* yet after Lincoln's election 
they must have realized that their party's calls 
for secession no longer related to their lifestyles. 
The Democratic Party had come to represent the fears 
and needs of the largest planters and tidewater 
aristocrats. The pleas of the leaders of Southern 
Democracy for unanimous support of secession were 
not heeded, and these Georgians voted for delegates 
not committed to secession. However, their votes 
were too little and too late to stop actions that 
had been bulding for over thirty years. 
It is ironic that the party of the common man 
in Georgia, Southern Democracy, should lose so many 
of the common men in the final days of its ante- 
bellum life. However, as at Charleston, the party 
machinery seemed to have a life of its own, and 
a momentum that was out of control. The Party no 
longer seemed to respond to the wishes of its support, 
or to represent them or their needs. Secession was 
desired by the tidewater aristocrats and the large 
landowners throughout Georgia. Although it was 
opposed by many former Whigs and the common man 
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it was not to be stopped, 
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